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ABSTRACT
Using a newly developed perspective provided by cross-cultural research, the concept of
face, I conducted three experiments to examine the impact self-construal, feedback
source and interpersonal contexts have on one’s reactions to negative self-relevant
information. In these experiments, characteristics of contexts including audience’s status,
audience’s standard, audience’s performance and publicness of the situation were
manipulated to examine participants’ reactions to feedback pertaining to an ostensibly
important ability. These experiments revealed that compared to the interdependent
self-construal, the independent self-construal was associated with higher levels of
self-serving responses. These self-serving responses include attributing failure to external
factors and attributing success to internal ones, derogating a failed test, and expressing
less interest in taking a failed rather than a succeeded test again. These self-serving
responses would be helpful for the independent self-construal individuals to maintain a
positive self-view. Inhibited self-serving behaviors, on the other hand, were observed in
the interdependent self-construal participants in some conditions such as when the
audience held a high standard and when the audience failed a test the participants
succeeded in. I argue that these inhibited self-serving responses were effective for the
interdependent self-construal individuals to restore social harmony and repair the face of
the affected others. Divergent routes individuals with different self-construals take to
achieve social well-being, self-esteem versus face, were discussed.
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Reacting to negative self-relevant information in an interpersonal context
Introduction
It is that time of year again. The time in the company where employees face, often with
anxiety, year-end performance appraisals handed down from the Human Resources. Walking
into the office located in a small town in Northeastern America in the morning, Tim and his
manager, Greg, were not all that excited when seeing the envelopes with the work evaluations
lying on their desks. “How did it go?” Greg asked Tim. It went really well. There were a lot
more checks than crosses on the long list of work-related items on Tim’s evaluation, and a lot
more checks than the last year. “I am awesome! And efforts do pay off!” Tim thought to himself.
Tim tried hard to hide his excitement, though. “I got 12 out of 20.”
Greg, Tim’s manager, was up for some self-disclosure. “I only got 7 checks out of 20,” he
revealed，“It sucks.” Tim was appalled at the fact that Greg’s evaluation was so low, and way
lower than his. “These evaluations are ambiguous—they do not reflect my ability at all,” Greg
thought to himself. Later that day, they went to the cafeteria area for a coffee break where people
were all chatting about their work evaluations. Quite casually, Greg asked Tim, “How did you
like our work evaluation system?” Tim was fully immersed in the self-esteem boost brought
about by his positive work evaluation. Besides, this could be the perfect time for him to impress
his manager. Without much thinking, he responded, “Oh I like our work evaluation system. I
worked really hard this year and I think I deserve my score.” Tim felt so good after taking credit
for his victory that he did not notice that Greg’s face became gloomier than it had been this
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morning.
Replace the names Tim and Greg with Zhe and Wang, and imagine the situation taking place
in an office located in a small city of the southwestern China. What might happen if the
underperforming manager, Wang, asked Zhe about his opinions on the work evaluation system?
Even though Zhe privately thought the work evaluations might to some extent make sense
(primarily because he got a good score), he was well aware that speaking his mind would not
only make Wang feel worse, but also make him look bad in front of a subordinate. And he knew
how important it was to save his manager’s face. So Zhe responded, “I don’t know about you,
but I do not think our work evaluation system is all that solid. It does not say a whole lot about a
person’s ability. I got lucky this year.” Zhe felt good after seeing Wang feel soothed and
comforted.
Why did Tim and Zhe respond to the same work feedback situation so differently? It may
have to do with their different cultural backgrounds, contexts, and their way of seeing themselves
and interacting with others. The current research was conducted to examine these phenomena
and the psychological principles behind them.
Negative feedback is an inevitable threat to one’s sense of wellbeing that everyone has to
confront throughout their lives. A large body of research has shown that people tend to respond
to negative feedback in a self-enhancing way to maintain a positive self-view (Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Greenwald, 1980; Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Shrauger,
1975; Taylor, 1991; Tesser, 2000). Negative feedback can also simultaneously threaten other
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important aspects of a person’s social world, including one’s public image, communication
smoothness, and relationship dynamics (Brown, 1968; Brown & Garland, 1971; Modigliani,
1971; Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Leary & Kowalski, 1990). The past five decades of false
feedback research has primarily focused on the impact of negative feedback on one’s self-view
(e.g., self-concept, self-esteem). Little research has been devoted to how negative feedback poses
threats of other kinds—threats that depend on who the interactants are and the relationship
between interactants.
The false feedback literature suggests that in general, a person tends to resort to self-serving
strategies to restore the affected self-view, such as ignoring, avoiding, or discounting negative
feedback (see vanDellen, Campbell, Hoyle, & Bradfield, 2011, for a review). Some pioneering
explorations involving situational variations (e.g. manipulating the extent to which negative
feedback is public, Arkin, Appelman, & Burger, 1980; Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Brown &
Gallagher, 1992; Frey, 1978; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1982; Leary, Barnes, &
Gribel, 1986; Schlenker, Weigold, & Hallam, 1990; Weary, 1980) have shown that self-serving
tendencies vary with factors related to the social context.
This work examined the impact social interaction contexts have on one’s reactions to
negative self-relevant information using newly developed perspectives provided by
cross-cultural research. While it is widely accepted that negative feedback threatens one’s
self-esteem, I argue that social contexts put important constraints on one’s self-serving responses
to negative feedback. How a person reacts to negative feedback involves not only the person
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him/herself, but also the social contexts, and the interaction between the person and the social
contexts. In addition, people’s way of construing their selves has an impact on how they interact
with their immediate social situations regarding negative feedback. Although past false feedback
research largely ignored the interaction dynamics between person and social context, I argue that
this interaction is important for understanding the influence of social situations on how people
with different self conceptions respond to negative feedback.
Recent findings in cross-cultural research (Brocker & Chen, 1996; Heine, Kitayama, &
Lehman, 2001a; Heine et al., 2001b; Oishi & Diener, 2003; Takata, 1987; 2003) have suggested
new distinctions and factors associated with interpersonal contexts that moderate the relationship
between false feedback and one’s responses. Just as cross-cultural research has provided new
concepts, theories, and methods for understanding a wide range of psychological phenomena
(Heine & Buchtel, 2009), it has provided new opportunities to shed light on the basic general
principles—relevant in any culture—that govern the process of responding to negative feedback.
The principles that determine one’s responses to false feedback could and should be informed by
the effects of contextual variations revealed by cross-cultural research. I seek to clarify the
principles that not only encompass past findings in false feedback research, but also
accommodate the effects of novel situational variations.
What I have learned from cross-cultural research (including cross-cultural false feedback
research) is that the reactions people show as their preferred responses to false feedback likely
depends on who the feedback recipient is, whether there is an audience when one responds to the
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feedback, and who the audience is. These factors constitute various interpersonal contexts that
can elicit differential reactions to negative feedback.
Responding to False feedback: A brief review
False feedback research has a history of over 50 years in the field of social psychology (see
Greenwald, 1980; Leary, Terry, Allen, & Tate, 2009; vanDellen et al., 2011, for reviews). While
specific manipulations used to elicit one’s natural response to negative feedback abounds, a false
feedback study paradigm usually involves placing participants in a situation in which they
receive negative information about themselves or their performance that challenges their sense of
wellbeing. Negative information is usually presented in the form of bogus results of what
participants believe is a test of intelligence (Brown & Dutton, 1995; Baumeister & Tice, 1985;
Greenberg et al., 1982; Millimet & Gardner, 1972), personality (Baumeister, 1982; Baumgardner,
Kaufman, & Levy, 1989; Ditto & Boardman, 1995), or some other valued aspects of the self
(Arkin et al., 1980; Brown, Collins, & Schmidt, 1988; Dodgson & Wood, 1998; Holmes, 1971;
Kernis, Brockner & Frankel, 1989). Bogus results usually take the form of being below the
average, being at the bottom of the percentile rankings, or being at the lower end of the score
distribution etc. Those tasks are considered ego-involving, and the results are assumed to have an
impact on self-esteem.
Many false feedback studies have focused on the impact of false feedback on one’s feelings
of self-esteem (see Hepper, Gramzow, & Sedikides, 2010, Leary et al., 2009, for reviews).
Negative feedback is intended to challenge one’s positive self-view and elicit responses to
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counteract that challenge. Such studies have found that people have a general tendency to defend
their self-esteem against negative feedback—by, for example, attributing failure to external
factors (Millimet & Gardner, 1972; Schlenker et al., 1990; Shrauger & Lund, 1975), inflating
self-evaluation (Baumeister, 1982; Brown & Dutton, 1995; Dodgson & Wood, 1998), ignoring
and dismissing the feedback (Brown et al., 1988), and discrediting the feedback source
(Baumgardner et al., 1989; Ditto & Boardman, 1995; Holmes, 1971).
False feedback research put in context: Who doesn’t self-enhance, when and why?
Although a specific self-serving mechanism, self-enhancement, has been established in the
Western social psychology literature as a general tendency when reacting to negative
self-relevant feedback, some researchers have shown that not all people respond to negative
information in a self-enhancing manner. Similarly, people do not self-enhance in all situations.
Self-esteem, for instance, has been found to affect whether a person self-enhances or not.
Individuals who possess low self-esteem have been found to evince more negative self-relevant
thoughts than positive ones in the face of negative feedback (Dogson & Wood, 1998), more
readily accept negative feedback as valid (Shrauger, 1975), show less compensatory
self-enhancement (Baumeister, 1982; Brown & Gallagher, 1992), have lower confidence about
performing well in a subsequent task (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981) and engage in fewer
self-serving biases (Baumeister & Tice, 1985; Taylor & Brown, 1988) than do people with high
self-esteem. This finding is also supported by self-verification research (see Swann,
Stein-Seroussi, & Giesler, 1992 for a review) which suggests that people with negative
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self-perceptions (e.g., low self-esteem) are more inclined to accept unfavorable evaluations than
are people with positive self-perceptions (e.g., high self-esteem; but see Baumgardner et al.,
1989 for an opposite pattern).
Some false feedback studies have been conducted with complete privacy for the recipient
of the feedback (see Baumgardner et al., 1989; Brown et al., 1988; Kernis et al., 1989; Millimet
& Gardner, 1972; Moreland & Sweeney, 1984 for examples), supposedly to rule out the potential
confounding effect of self-presentational concerns and to examine private self-enhancement in
isolation. In an effort to demonstrate the impact of negative feedback on one’s public self (i.e.,
one’s perceived public image), some other researchers have manipulated how public negative
feedback is (Arkin et al., 1980; Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Brown & Gallagher, 1992; Dodgson
& Wood, 1998; Frey, 1978; Greenberg & Pyszczynski,1985; Greenberg, et al., 1982; Schlenker
et al., 1990; Shrauger & Lund, 1975; Tetlock, 1981; Weary, 1980). In those studies, participants
were led to believe that the feedback would be revealed to an audience. It has generally been
found that self-presentational concerns play a role in moderating one’s responses to negative
feedback, which is associated with an increased tendency to self-enhance, dismiss the feedback
and/or attribute it to external factors in the public situation (e.g. Schlenker et al., 1990; Tetlock,
1981). Some research has revealed an increased tendency to self-enhance in domains unrelated
to the feedback (i.e., compensatory self-enhancement; Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Greenberg &
Pyszczynski, 1985). A number of other studies, on contrary, found a decreased tendency in
individuals to self-enhance in response to failure in public. For instance, Smith and Whitehead
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(1993) found that people who expect to interact with an informed audience show a decreased
tendency to self-enhance following negative feedback, presumably because information
objectivity rather than self-positivity was given priority (also see Arkin et al., 1980; Brown &
Gallagher, 1992; Greenberg et al., 1982; Ross, Biebrauer, & Polly, 1974; Weary, 1980).
Thus, although not completely absent, self-serving responses (e.g., self-enhancement,
public-image enhancement, etc.) have been found to be attenuated among certain groups of
people or in response to certain experimental manipulations. There has not been a systematic
examination of exactly who does not self-enhance, or when and why. Self-enhancement has been
considered a universal motivation and people’s default reaction to negative feedback (Greenwald,
1980; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Alicke & Sedikides, 2009)—that is, before counterevidence was
introduced from the cross-cultural research area in the last two decades.
Cross-cultural differences in responses to negative feedback
Expanding the scope to other cultures (e.g., the East Asian culture), some research suggests
that self-enhancement is largely absent. Using the research paradigms developed by Western
researchers, a body of research that includes examination of self-enhancement motivation in
other cultures has failed to find a consistent self-enhancement pattern (Brocker & Chen, 1996;
Brown & Kobayashi, 2002; Cai et al., 2011; Heine, Kitayama, & Lehman, 2001a; Heine et al.,
2001b; Kurman, 2001; Takata, 1987, 2003). Research involving cross-cultural comparisons
suggests that East Asians respond to threatening self-relevant information in a
self-improving/effacing, rather than self-protecting/enhancing, way (see Heine, 2005a for a
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review). For instance, compared with Westerners, East Asians rate opportunities to lose as more
important than opportunities to win (Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000), persist more on a task
following failure and less after success (Heine et al., 2001b; Oishi & Diener, 2003), and are
motivated more by negative role models. A closer examination of this research provides new
perspectives on the long-studied social phenomenon of self-enhancement in response to negative
feedback.
Before cross-cultural inconsistencies were widely recognized, it had long been assumed that
self-enhancement was a person’s default reaction to negative feedback (Greenwald, 1980; Taylor
& Brown, 1988). Evidence from research involving East Asian participants not only brought
about new ways of theorizing about self-enhancement motivation, but also led to novel
explorations aimed at a fuller understanding of this phenomenon. Such efforts include the recent
debate over whether self-enhancement is fundamental to all human beings (see Sedikides,
Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005, 2007 for one side of this debate,
and see Heine & Hamamura, 2007 for the other side). I hope to contribute to the debate by
incorporating several overlooked factors that are salient in the East Asian self-enhancement
literature.
Explaining cultural differences: Different routes to social well-being
Negative feedback not only poses challenge to the feedback receiver’s worth as a competent
task performer, but also conveys to the person a kind of negative social message that others fail
to care for the person’s feelings. False feedback research in the past has largely focused on how
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reactions to negative feedback are guided by the goal to restore a positive self-view. Researchers
have emphasized the influence of negative feedback on one’s sense of “Am I good?” or “Do I
look good?” (see Campbell, Sedikides, Reeder, & Elliot, 2000, for a similar view). Although it is
incontrovertible that the way people feel about themselves is an important aspect of
psychological life, what has been missing from this research is the influence of negative
feedback on the way people feel in a given interpersonal context – an equally important aspect of
psychological life. Besides “Am I good?” and “Do I look good?”, a person also cares about “Is it
going well?” and “Did anyone get hurt?). The latter two questions reflect one’s concern about
interpersonal interaction dynamics, which are indispensable aspects of social lives(see Figure 2).
While the impact of negative feedback on self-esteem and public self image (Tetlock, 1981;
Schlenker, 1980; Weary, 1980; Shrauger & Lund, 1975; Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Dodgson &
Wood, 1998) has received some attention in the self-presentation literature, I am aware of few
studies that have explicitly tested the impact feedback has on individuals’ concern with
interpersonal interaction dynamics (but see Lalwani & Shavitt, 2009, for an exception). Negative
feedback involves more than just a threat to self-esteem, and this could explain why some people,
or people in some situations or cultures, tend not to self-enhance.
A large portion of the West-East differences in response to negative feedback has been
attributed to a fundamental difference in the self-view of Westerners and East Asians (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991). Western culture embraces individualistic self-construal, which is a form of self
that differentiates a person from others in terms of unique traits, experiences, and characteristics.
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The Western cultural self places an emphasis on independence, self-sufficiency, uniqueness, and
freedom from social constraints. East Asian culture, on the other hand, nurtures collectivistic
self-views, which consist of a form of self that is derived from membership in important groups
and represent aspects of the self that are shared with group members and that members from
non-members. The East Asian cultural self emphasizes cooperation, interpersonal harmony, and
the importance of others.
The well-being of an individualistic self could be optimized by focusing on preserving
self-esteem, where one’s self-view is not socially conferred, a sense of “I think I am doing well”.
The welfare of a collectivistic self is optimized by maintaining social esteem (i.e., face), where
one’s self-view is defined by the extent to which one has fulfilled social expectations with
respect to one’s relative position/role. The collectivistic self is socially conferred in a sense of
“Others think I am doing well” (Heine & Buchtel, 2009) and “Things are going well”.
The differential emphasis Westerners and East Asians place on preserving self-esteem
versus social esteem has arisen from the two distinct cultures that shaped different psychological
processes aimed at a sense of wellbeing. Along with this distinction, some social psychologists
contend that East Asians and Westerners differentially prioritize the two resources that promote a
sense of wellbeing—that is, self-esteem and face (e.g. Heine, 2005, 2008; Heine & Buchtel,
2009). A focus on the individualistic self leads individuals to attend to self-esteem, which would
benefit most from self-enhancement. A focus on the collectivistic self leads individuals to
maintain relationship harmony and social order, where self-enhancement would not be of much
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help. This reasoning suggests that inconsistencies seen between Westerners and East Asians in
their responses to negative feedback may be attributed to the divergent routes they each take to
achieve a sense of well-being.
Another route to social well-being: The concept of face
When negative self-relevant information is presented, one can either bolster one’s
self-evaluations or public image to maintain a sense of well-being. Alternatively, one could
avoid confrontations and attend to social harmony to restore a sense of well-being. As discussed
above, much research has revealed that Westerners have a habitual tendency to confront or
retaliate against negative feedback in a self-enhancing manner. Although evidence is limited, it
has been found that East Asians tend to reduce the social impact of negative feedback and
respond to it in a self-criticizing (self-deprecating) manner, such as making internal attributions
for one’s failure and persisting on the failed task (Heine et al., 2001b). It seems that members of
the East Asian culture place a lesser emphasis on self-esteem restoration than those of the
Western culture.
As has been suggested by many researchers (Heine, 2005; Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-swing
2011) elsewhere in the literature, whereas some people (e.g., Westerners) or people in some
situations (e.g., when the focus is on the individualistic self) maintain well-being mainly through
restoring threatened self-esteem in the face of negative feedback, other people (e.g., East Asians)
or people in other situations (e.g., when the focus is on the collectivistic self) do it through
focusing on repairing a threatened “face”.

13

This section aims at introducing the concept of “face” in social psychology terms and setting
the stage for a discussion of face-related variables that may come into play in affecting one’s
responses towards negative feedback.
In an East Asian society, face occupies a central place in people’s lives just as self-esteem
does to Westerners. When East Asians lose face, “it is impossible for them to function properly
in the society” (Hu, 1944. p. 45).
Goffman (1956) laid the groundwork for the concept of face based on Chinese
anthropologist Hu’s (1944) work. Goffman (1956) conceptualized face as “an image of self
delineated in terms of approved social attributes” (p. 5). Several other scholars have refined and
elaborated on this concept. Face has been defined as “the respectability and/or deference which a
person can claim for himself from others by virtue of their relative position” in a hierarchy and
the proper fulfillment of his/her role (Ho, 1976, p. 883). Brown and Levinson (1987) consider
face to be a public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself. Ting-Toomey (1988)
conceptualizes face as an individual’s claimed sense of favorable social self-image in a relational
and network context. It has been seen as a “measure of the recognition accorded by society”
(Hwang, 1989, p. 305) and described as a form of respect with which people treat each other in
the course of their interactions.
In spite of an absence of completely convergent views among previous researchers, three
significant aspects inherent in the conceptualization of face can be inferred. First, part of face
refers to people’s concern with how they are evaluated by others. This part of the concept of face
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appears to be similar to the Western concept of public image (or public self; see Leary &
Kowalski, 1990). Similar to the Western public image, maintaining face often involves creating,
maintaining, defending, and enhancing one’s own social identity (Goffman, 1959). However,
unlike the Western public image over which individuals have agentic control to the degree that
one can actively influence public opinions of one’s self through self-enhancing (Goffman, 1959),
face is a social judgment which has to be passively claimed from others. It reflects the public
knowledge about a person that is consensually shared over which one does not have much
agentic control. In situations where individuals are not in a position to have agentic control in
terms of enhancing their public images (i.e., face), image enhancing actions often take a back
seat to more situationally appropriate face-saving strategies.
More importantly, face involves both sides of the interaction. It entails interacting with
others in ways that “permit protection of each actor’s face” (King, 1989). Face has a natural
relational aspect to it. A concern for other’s face is what most clearly distinguishes
face-management from public image (or impression-management) and other related ideas. Public
image management involves making one’s best characteristics salient to the interaction partner
(Leary & Kowalski, 1990). On the other hand, face-management is about saving the face of all
participants in a given social interaction. Face-management helps maintain the interaction order
and flow as a way to avoid embarrassing moments for all participants (Goffman, 1955). It not
only involves maintaining public image to the degree allowed by the situation, but also the
upholding of both one’s own and the interaction partner’s image to keep the social encounter
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smooth and harmonious (Goffman, 1955) to the extent that sometimes it may mean prioritizing
the interaction partner’s face. The distinctive feature of face that involves maintaining others’
face plays a direct role in informing the current research, where one’s response to negative
feedback dependent on maintaining important others’ face will be examined.
To an East Asian who has a habitual tendency to attend to external situations, what matters
is to have a lot of face, that is, a great deal of social approval and being treated in a way that
matches his or her status relative to others in a given situation. Self-esteem is not a major
concern; a person can have a low self-esteem and still feel good about his/her life if he/she has
much face that comes with the kind of respect permitted by his or her status and actual situation.
The current research hopes to demonstrate situations in which people would inhibit self-serving
tendencies to give way to face-management. I expect to see self-construal, publicness, and other
people’s status and standards play a role in these situations, redistributing participants’ efforts to
either mainly enhance self-esteem or care for face.
Face-loss situations: Self-construal, External standards, Status, and Publicness matter
In pioneering field work on face, several conditions were identified where face loss may
arise: 1) failure to fulfill social expectations (Modigliani, 1968, 1971); 2) a violation of social
norms (Edelmann, 1985); and 3) not being treated by others as respectfully as one’s own face
deserves (Ho, 1976). Loss of face is exacerbated if those conditions are witnessed by real or
imagined others. These conditions inform important manipulations in the experimental designs in
the current research.
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Although the desire for face may be culturally universal (Goffman, 1955; Brown &
Levinson, 1987), one’s concern with face appears to be strongest, most common, and most
consistent in the context of communal relationships (e.g., those in East Asian cultures), which are
characterized by expectations of mutual concern. Negative feedback from others naturally
implies the loss of face to East Asians given their emphasis on external approval and social
harmony. As has been discussed above, the East Asian cultural model embraces an
interdependent form of self which seems to be at the root of the East-West difference in terms of
responding to feedback. The current research experimentally induced the East Asian mode of self
conception (i.e., Interdependent self-construal, or InterSC in the following—see Studies 2 and 3),
with the expectation that it would lead to response patterns distinct from those with a Western
mode of self conception (i.e. Independent self-construal, or IndeSE in the following). It is thus
expected that people who possess an interdependent form of self-construal emphasize
self-esteem less than face when it comes to responding to negative feedback, compared with
those who possess an IndeSC.
The preceding discussion of face loss conditions suggests that face loss and related
behaviors may be examined in situations where social expectations are made salient. To examine
the association between social expectations and face-loss resulted behaviors, the current research
manipulated conditions where participants with either an independent or interdependent
self-construal received feedback that indicates that other people think that they have failed or
succeeded at a task (Other Standard, see Study 2). While people in general consider others’
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standards seriously to the degree that others’ standards convey important information about
social acceptance (e.g., Sociometer theory, Leary, 2005), not all people react to other’s standards
in the same manner. In support of a positive self-view, those who prioritize self-esteem (e.g., a
person who possesses an IndeSC) would react more defensively to other people’s high standards
and be more accepting of other people’s low standards than those who do not. Conversely, to
those who prioritize face (e.g., a person with an InterSC), retaliating against other people’s
comments puts the others’ face under threat. Thus they would more readily accept others’
standards as valid, which is helpful for maintaining a harmonious social discourse (see Figure 2).
The discussion of face loss conditions suggests that upholding other peoples’ face in an
interaction is important because it implies that the others are “being treated as respectfully as
one’s face deserves”. It also suggests that not all negative feedback from others would affect all
people. A large part of how much face a person deserves hinges on that person’s position in the
social hierarchy. Therefore, the current research (Study 2) also involves manipulation of the
other’s status aiming at exploring the impact of status on the variations of self-serving behaviors.
Whereas a person who emphasizes self-esteem would feel more compelled to defend against a
high status other’s criticism than a low status other’s because impressing a high status other is
more important than impressing a low status other, a person who emphasizes face would not feel
the same. Negative feedback that comes from a high status person would not be considered by a
face-centered person threatening, because the high status person in any given interaction is
supposed to have more power to judge the other and be treated respectfully as his/her status
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deserves. Negative feedback from a low status person, on the other hand, is a signal that
interaction rules are disrupted because a low status person is not in a position to criticize and
embarrass the other. After all, the upholding of the higher-positioned person’s face is always
expected from face-centered people for maintaining the social order (Chang & Holt, 1994) in a
given hierarchical relationship.
According to the discussion of face loss conditions, face loss is exacerbated if the situations
are made public. In one of the study conditions (Studies 2 and 3) in the current research,
participants were asked to provide responses to feedback in public as if they were to
communicate with an audience. Face, by definition, is a socially (and most often publicly)
granted identity. In a private setting, face is only relevant in the sense that one would anticipate
face loss once a private negative outcome is made public. In a public situation, interaction
harmony is achieved by each individual playing the proper role of explicitly showing signs of
caring for the other interactant’s face. Given the above reasoning, the current research addressed
individuals’ responses to feedback against the backdrop of a public situation versus a private
situation (Study 3).
Inhibiting self-serving tendencies: A way of saving face
Self-serving behaviors certainly bring many benefits to people as they serve to protect
self-esteem and preserve self-positivity. Self-serving behaviors, on the other hand, also come
with social costs as they may, in some situations, raise social discomfort and damage
interpersonal relationships (Carlson & Shovar, 1983; Forsyth, Berger, & Mitchell, 1981; Powers
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& Zuroff, 1988). For instance, retaliating against another person’s criticism may enhance one’s
self-esteem at the expense of hurting the social relationship. Attempting to explain away one’s
negative performance may protect one’s positive self-view at the risk of embarrassing other
interactants. These self-serving behaviors are likely to cause interpersonal tension which could
pose a serious threat to those who are concerned more about social harmony (i.e., face) than
self-esteem. This explains why those people refrain from self-enhancement and inhibit
self-serving tendencies in some situations.
Inhibited self-serving behaviors are defined broadly in the current research and can include
different forms. One form of inhibited self-serving behavior may be an attenuated self-serving
tendency. Another form may be an absence or reverse (e.g., self-criticizing or self-deprecating
behaviors) of a self-serving tendency. Being self-critical (or self-deprecating) serves to inhibit
self-serving tendencies which could potentially benefit social interactions in two ways. On the
one hand, criticizing one’s self allows the other person to feel good about him or her self as a
result of downward social comparison. On the other, self-criticism implies that the feedback
from the other person is valid, or that one has expected even less respect that the feedback
conveys. This discrepancy between one’s ostensible expected respect and other’s actual appraisal
of one’s self allows an interaction to smoothen without confrontations or conflict. The current
research utilized a series of response measures to examine participants’ tendency to inhibit
self-serving tendencies. For example, participants were presented with a detailed interpretation
of their test result (Studies 2 and 3) which contained both positive and negative information
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about their selves. Then they were asked to recall the detailed feedback in their own words while
responding to an audience. A tendency to either recall no more positive than negative
self-relevant information, or to reveal more negative than positive self-relevant information
would be a sign of inhibited self-serving behavior.
Alternatively, an individual can inhibit self-serving tendencies by making internal
attributions for failure. Blaming oneself functions similarly to self-criticism in that it allows the
individual to prematurely take responsibility for the fault, thereby eliminating the opportunity of
direct confrontations involved in questioning the validity of the feedback. In the current research,
participants were asked to make attributions for their performance results. Attributing failure to
internal factors (e.g. ability and effort) and success to external factors (e.g. luck or task difficulty)
would be a sign of inhibiting self-serving tendencies.
Some of these inhibited self-serving behaviors have already been observed in false feedback
studies with East Asian samples (Heine et al., 2001b, Hoshino-Browne & Spencer, 2000). Heine
(2005b; also see Heine, & Buchtel, 2009) and other authors (Ting-Toomey, 1988) speculated that
prioritizing face is likely to elicit self-criticizing/deprecating responses in the face of negative
feedback in East Asians, in a similar way that prioritizing self-esteem elicits
self-enhancing/serving responses in Westerners. The potential association between face and
cross-cultural differences in response to false feedback sheds new light on individuals’ responses
to negative feedback. The current research adopts the concept of face and rethink false feedback
research from the perspective of saving face.
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Rethinking false feedback studies in the light of face
The concept of face is one that emerges quite naturally in research on East Asians’ ways of
responding to negative feedback, but has been largely absent in the Western false feedback
research literature. Although face is an indigenous construct to the East Asian culture, it has been
considered a universal desire (Goffman, 1955; Brown & Levinson, 1987). Translated into
psychology terms, face reflects one’s concern about public reputation as determined by others’
approval; it also reflects one’s concern with others’ wellbeing and social harmony.
Through the theoretical lens of face, false feedback research conducted in the past lack
manipulations concerning important characteristics of the social context in which responses to
negative feedback are made (see Arkin et al., 1980; Brown & Garland, 1971, Smith &
Whitehead, 1993 for examples of exceptions). Although face itself may not be as familiar a
concern to Westerners as it is to East Asians, factors related to face undoubtedly plays an
important role in Westerner’s lives. These factors, explicitly, are self-construal, other’s standards,
other’s status and publicness of the situation. I believe that the perspective of face drawn from
cross-cultural research will be useful for understanding prior false feedback research, and for
designing novel research to address unanswered questions in both the self-enhancement and
self-presentation literatures.
Past attempts at explaining self-serving behavioral tendencies in false feedback research
using an isolated, private setting are insufficient in terms of capturing the behavioral variances
which could have been caused by interpersonal dynamics. In studies which did include
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interpersonal interactions, responses were collected as reactions to other unrelated, unimportant
participants or researchers. Very few studies have examined variations of self-serving tendencies
people exhibit which might have stemmed from concerns about other, important participants in a
given interaction (Baumgardner, Kaufman, Levy, 1989; Brockner & Chen, 1996; Lalwani, &
Shavitt, 2009). The current research addresses this oversight in past false feedback research in
that it examines how people respond to feedback in situations where important others are present.
While I acknowledge that being self-serving allows those who are concerned about self-esteem
to regain self-positivity when protecting unrelated, unimportant others’ welfare is not a major
concern, I also assert that a person who cares about the other’s wellbeing and social harmony
would inhibit self-serving behaviors, because protecting the integrity of the other’s self-esteem
would be deemed more important than making oneself feel good, especially when the other is an
important figure (e.g., a higher status person).
The current research will go beyond past studies by manipulating degrees of importance of
others (e.g., high status vs. low status) involved in a feedback receiving situation. This
manipulation allows one to test the inhibited self-serving tendencies of people who focus more
on social and interpersonal harmony than self-esteem in various interpersonal situations: When
feedback comes from a high-status other, concerns with protecting the other’s face would lead to
inhibited self-serving responses.
The current research: Self-serving or inhibited self-serving? It depends on social contexts!
The current research is concerned with responses following negative feedback in various
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social contexts and the role concerns with others play in this process. Derived from the
discussion about face, I assume that people not only possess a need for having a positive
self-view, but also possess a need for maintaining interpersonal harmony. Negative information
related to one’ self threatens the validity of people’s desired self-view, as well as their desired
social relationships.
Although in some situations, people are sensitive to opportunities for self-enhancement, in
other situations, their goal may shift from protecting self-feelings to protecting the other’s
feelings designated by the interaction context. That is, when one is concerned about others (e.g.,
when one possesses an InterSC), especially when others’ welfare is prioritized in a certain
interaction, inhibited self-serving responses may result in order to maintain relationship harmony
and the hierarchical order, and thus protect the other people’s welfare. Inhibited self-serving
behaviors include self-deprecating actions such as attributing failure to internal factors rather
than situational ones, taking responsibility for one’s own faults, criticizing one’s self, and doing
the opposite for success. These self-deprecating strategies would be particularly effective in
repairing the face of the affected others in an interaction (especially when the others’ welfare is
important and prioritized).
Three experiments were conducted to collect evidence for these variations of self-serving
tendencies as a function of social context. In these experiments, characteristics of contexts
including self-construal, other’s status, other’s standard, other’s performance and publicness of
the situation were manipulated to examine people’s reactions to feedback. I predicted that the
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IndeSC would be associated with concerns with self-esteem and thus self-serving reactions,
whereas the InterSC would be associated with more concerns with the other’s welfare and social
harmony and thus inhibited self-serving reactions. These pattern of behaviors were expected to
be moderated by specificity of situation. I predicted that people with the IndeSC would respond
more self-servingly towards a high-status other rather than a low-status other, especially in
public than in private. On the other hand, those with the InterSC would respond similarly to the
IndeSC individuals in private, but would inhibit self-serving tendencies in public, especially
when responding to a high-status person rather than a low-status person.
Materials and tasks overview
Three experiments (see Figures 1, 2, and 3) were conducted to test the idea that social
contexts associated with face-saving motivation moderate the relationship between self-relevant
feedback and one’s responses. Participants completed an ego-involving task, believing that they
had done well or poorly (internal feedback, see Studies 1, 2 and 3), and that an audience of
varied status either did or did not think that they had done well or poorly (Other’s Standard, see
Study 2), or that the audience had done well or poorly (see Study 3). Participants were then
tested on a number of post-feedback response measures. These measures include attributions
made for failure/success, evaluation of the task, and reconstruction of detailed feedback (only in
Studies 2 and 3). Participants provided responses on these measures believing that another
participant who varied in level of relative status would see their reactions (only in Studies 2 and
3). All the tasks and measures were programmed with the online software Qualtrics and
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presented electronically to participants. Participants used the computer keyboard to enter their
responses, which allows data to be saved electronically.
Ego-involving task. Participants completed an ego-involving task on a computer. The task
was described in such a way that participants would believe it assesses an important aspect of
“integrative ability”. This task name was fabricated to ensure that participants did not have a
good sense of what their “integrative ability” level was; otherwise, the feedback might not have
been convincing. Participants were told that they would take part in a standardized test of
integrative ability which had proven to have high validity and reliability. The task was in fact an
established intelligence test, Raven's Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court & Raven, 1988), which
includes 36 multiple choice question items. Each question contains a 6 × 6, 4 × 4, or 3 × 3 matrix
of figures that follow a certain pattern (see Figure 1 for an example). For each question, the
participant is asked to identify the missing element that completes the pattern depicted by the
matrix. The task was administered in a private setting, so that no one was around during the time
when participants were completing the task. Participants’ own standards of evaluation as well as
their perceptions of others’ standards (Study 2) or performance (Study 3) were later manipulated,
which constituted different kinds of false feedback.
Internal false feedback. Before the task started, previous participants’ scores were made
available to the participant. Previous participants’ scores were made up (i.e., fictional) and
manipulated so that some participants saw that the majority of previous participants’ scores were
on the low end (between 20 and 60 out of 100, such as 26.9, 37.4, 56.0—the Low-standard
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condition in studies 1 and 3), and others saw that most previous scores were on the high end
(between 60 and 100, such as 78.4, 85.1, 98.5—the High-standard condition in studies 1, 2 and
3). After having participants spend sixty seconds viewing previous participants’ scores, they
were asked to estimate what they considered to be a good score range, which served as a
manipulation check for participants’ standards.
After the task was completed, task results were presented on the computer screen in the form
of a single number score along with a paragraph that included a detailed interpretation of the
score. All the participants saw scores in the same narrow range: 58-62 points (with one decimal
point). If a person viewed the low-score version for previous scores, then this test result would be
indicative of positive performance. If a person viewed the high-score version for previous scores,
then this test result would be indicative of unsatisfactory performance.
In Studies 2 and 3, participants also received a paragraph of detailed feedback following the
test score. The detailed feedback included an equal amount of positive and negative information
allegedly pertaining to the participant’s probable behaviors (see Appendix B). The feedback
contained three sets of four behavioral descriptions, two positive and two negative in valence,
exemplifying each of the three critical personality traits, trustworthiness, kindness, and
socialness. The three sets were presented to the participants in a random order right after they
received their scores with the four behavioral descriptions having been randomized within each
set.
Prime. Participants were primed to either focus on the self or on others in Studies 2 and 3.
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The concept of an independent self or an interdependent self was primed to direct participant’s
attention to either their uniqueness or their similarity with others. This task is adapted from prior
research (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991; Lalwani & Shavitt, 2009). I expected that the
IndeSC prime would direct participants’ attention towards their self-esteem, while the InterSC
prime would lead participants to be more sensitive to social contexts and emphasizing the other
interactant’ welfare. In studies 2 and 3, the self-construal prime was introduced after participants
had received the integrative ability test score and feedback and before participants read about the
audience’s standards (Study 2) or performance (Study 3), after which participants would respond
to the dependent measures. Because the prime was presented with the cover story that it was the
second part of the integrative ability test, introducing it after the integrative ability test helped
maintain the credibility of the cover story. For this reason, the prime also needed to be presented
before introducing the audience. If it was presented after introducing the audience’s standard or
performance, it would have disrupted the continuity of the cover story and would have been
more likely to raise suspicion in the participants. Moreover, because the prime was used to
increase the temporal accessibility of a particular self-construal, arranging it as close to the
dependent measures as possible helped ensure that the effect of the prime lasted when
participants responded to the dependent measures.
External false feedback. In addition to internal false feedback, participants also received
feedback regarding other people’s standards (Study 2) or performance (Study 3) for evaluating
an Integrative Ability test score. In Study 2, Other’s standards were delivered in a way that some
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participants believed that another participant (e.g., a senior graduate student or a high-school
student in Study 2) held a high standard (“A score of above 80 is considered by this person a
good score”) or low standard (“A score above 40 is considered by this person a good score”) for
Integrative Ability scores. In Study 3, participants were told that another participant who was a
senior graduate student had completed the same test and received either a high score (“80”, in the
grad-success condition) or a low score (“40”, in the grad-fail condition).
Audience status manipulation. After having received the score (Studies 1, 2 and 3) and
feedback (Studies 2 and 3 only), participants were instructed to complete a series of response
measures. In Study 1, participants completed the post-feedback measures in private. In Studies 2
and 3, they were led to believe that either a high school student or a senior graduate student
would have access to their responses to the feedback.
Post-feedback response measures. Multiple measures were used to examine how participants
would react to feedback. These measures included attributions made for performance, evaluation
of the test, comparison to others, and recall of the detailed interpretation of test results (Studies 2
and 3 only). The order in which the first three of those dependent measures were presented to
participants was randomized (recall was always the last measure).
Study 1
Study 1 involved internal false feedback (positive vs. negative) only; the primary goal was to
test whether the internal feedback manipulation was perceived as intended and to establish the
effect of negative (vs. positive) internal feedback on self-serving responses.
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Design
Study 1 followed a one-factor (Internal feedback: positive vs. negative) between-subject
design.
Hypotheses
Study 1 was conducted in a private setting where only internal feedback (positive vs.
negative) was involved. Participants were told that their responses would be kept anonymous and
confidential; their responses should thus not have involved any concerns for maintaining a public
image in the eyes of others. Given the nature of the manipulation, I expected that the primary
goal for participants in Study 1 when responding to the private feedback would be to maintain a
positive self-view (i.e., to self-serve). I predicted that participants’ responses would gravitate
towards protecting self-esteem. I hypothesized that when receiving internal, negative feedback
about their performance and responding in a private setting, participants would be likely to
attribute poor performance to external factors, derogate the test (i.e., perceiving the test to be
unfair, invalid, and unclear), derogate others (i.e., perceiving others to be incompetent and
similar to themselves), express less interest in taking the test again, and recall more positive than
negative test feedback. I hypothesized that the opposite patterns (except for a less prominent
pattern for recall) would be observed when participants received internal, positive performance
feedback and responded privately.
Participants

30

An a priori power analysis using the software G*Power 3.1 was conducted to determine an
approximate sample size. Given the one-factor two-level multivariate design in Study 1, the
power analysis recommended a sample size between 80 and 110 to achieve a power between 0.8
and 0.9 to detect a medium effect. One hundred undergraduates at Syracuse University
participated in Study 1 for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to the positive
internal feedback or negative internal feedback condition. Ninety-five participants finished the
study (21 males vs. 74 females), and their data were entered into the statistical analysis.
Participants in Study 1 had a mean age of 18.6 (SD = 1.50) at the time of the study. On average,
17.1 (out of 36, SD = 5.83, or 47.5%) of the Raven’s test items were completed within the five
minute time limit, of which an average of 10.4 (SD = 3.67, or 60.8%) items were correct. 63.2%
of the participants were Caucasians, 5.3% African Americans, 7.4% Hispanics, and 24.2%
Asians.
Procedure
Participants were run individually in a private setting for Study 1. After the participant
arrived at the laboratory, he or she was greeted by a trained experimenter who had no knowledge
of the hypotheses of the study. Then the participant was directed to an individual private cubicle
and asked to sit in front of the computer (see Figure 3 for an illustration of the study procedure).
The participant was directed to read the consent form presented at the beginning of the
computer program first. Then the participant was told that they would complete multiple parts of
the study with strict confidentiality; the experimenter only entered the room (to provide
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directions) when the participant encountered a “Stop” signal in between sections of the study.
The participant was then told—
“Please sit comfortably in front of the computer as you will be doing a task on it. Before
it begins, please spend a few minutes reading the consent and if you agree, please click yes to
proceed. Then you will be asked to fill out some demographic information, which is a
standard part of any study. You subject ID is _____. Any information you put in will only be
connected with this number and won’t be linked to your name or identification. For the most
part I will leave you alone in the room. But, whenever you see a stop sign on the computer,
please come out and get me so I can give you more information.”
Then the experimenter left participant alone in the room. After the participant answered
demographic questions including gender, age, year in school, and ethnicity, there was a “Stop”
signal on the computer asking the participant to look for the experimenter for further directions.
The experimenter entered the cubicle to describe the “Integrative Ability” task to the participant
and directed him or her to begin the practice questions. The participant was told—
“This task is about an important ability called Integrative Ability. According to two decades
of research, integrative ability is considered the strongest indicator of success in relationships,
work, and physical well-being. People who do well in this task are those who will succeed in
work as well as play, building flourishing careers and lasting, meaningful relationships. The
test has a total of 100 points. We will get you started on some practice questions of the
integrative ability task. You will do two practice items. There is no time limit for the practice,
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so you can take as long as you want. Those are not going to be scored. Feel free to go back and
forth while you familiarize yourself with the test.”
After the participant finished the practice items, another stop sign appeared on the
computer screen. The experimenter then entered the room to explain the next part: previous
participants’ scores. The participant was told—
“Before you actually start the test, we will show you some previous participants’ scores for
you to get an idea about the task. The test has a total of 100 points. These scores are
standardized scores rounded up to one decimal point. These data were collected over the last 5
years from schools, colleges, and universities all over the country. These students came from
various majors, years, and ethnicity backgrounds, although we cannot disclose their
demographic information to you. These students are a representative sample of high school
students, graduate students and college students just like you in the US. If you hover your
mouse over a subject ID, you will see that person’s score on the Integrative Ability test. There
is an example on the screen which you can try out. You have one minute to check out some
scores like this one, which should give you an idea of what the test is like. You do not have to
go by order since these scores are randomly shuffled.”
Two hundred previous participants’ scores were made up and presented in ten columns on
the next screen. The participant was randomly presented with one of the two versions of previous
scores that were set up beforehand, one mostly containing low scores (between 20 and 60, out of
100), and the other high scores (between 60 and 100). The participant was automatically directed
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to the next screen when the one minute timer ran out. On this screen, the participant was asked
“Now that you have viewed some previous participants’ scores, which category of the following
scores would you think a typical person would reasonably get in the integrative ability test?” as a
manipulation check. The participant was given the following options of score ranges: 1-10 pts,
11-20 pts, 21-30 pts, and so on until 91-100 pts.
After the participant provided his or her judgment, the stop signal for directions for the
actual task appeared. The experimenter entered the room and provided instructions for the actual
integrative ability task:
“Now is the actual Integrative Ability test. In the actual test, you have 5 minutes to
answer 36 questions. These questions are similar to the practice items, but some are more
difficult than others. You want to make sure you are as accurate and fast as possible. You can
always skip questions and come back later. I will leave you alone from this point on. Your
behavior is not observed or recorded in any form, as we hope to make you feel as comfortable
as possible in order to maximize your performance on the task. The computer will generate
your result and an interpretation of your score immediately after the 5 minutes run out.
Please just come out and see me after you are done.”
After the participant completed the 5-minute task, a score was shown on the next screen. All
the participants received a test score around 60 pts with variations no greater than +2 or -2 (e.g.
59.8 pts, 61.5 pts). The exact test scores were varied among the participants to minimize the
potential cost caused by participants crosstalking about the study. If the same score was
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presented every time, participants who cross-talked could have raised suspicions about the
experiment, which could have invalidated the data that were collected thereafter.
After receiving the feedback, the participant was directed out of the cubicle into a different
room adjacent to the cubicle. Participants were told that the cubicle was the “Testing Room”,
while the room they were currently in was the “Survey Room”. Participants received dependent
measures on a computer in this room. After the participant had been seated, the experimenter
provided instructions about the dependent measures under the cover story that the survey was for
our lab to improve the test. The participants were told—
“Besides accumulating data on the Integrative ability test, our lab is also in the process of
developing educational tools to help the public learn more about integrative ability.
Information you provide in the following questionnaire in terms of your experience with this
test would be crucial for us. Information you have input is assigned a random number, thus is
not identifiable. The data we collect from you will not be disclosed to any other parties.”
Participants were left alone to answer the survey questions. In the survey, participants were
presented with a self-evaluation question, attribution measures, test evaluation questions, and
comparison-with-others questions. Participants always received the comparison-with-others
questions last. The comparison-with-others questions were always presented last because
requiring participants to compare themselves with others could have affected how they made
attributions and evaluated the test. The order in which they received all other questions was
randomized.
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The self-evaluation question asked participants how well they thought they did on the
integrative ability test (Self-evaluation) on a 7-point scale (1= extremely poor, 7 = extremely
well). In terms of attribution, participants were asked to indicate on 5-point scales (1 = not at all,
5 = extremely) the extent to which their ability (Ability Attribution), amount of effort they put
into taking the test (Effort Attribution), and luck (Luck Attribution) were responsible for their
performance. These specific dimensions have been used in many previous studies (e.g. Miller &
Ross, 1975; Weary-Bradley, 1978; Greenberg et al., 1982) and have been considered to be valid
measures of causal attributions (Elig & Frieze, 1979). In terms of test evaluation, participants
were asked to indicate how difficult (Difficulty Perception), fair (Fairness Perception) and valid
(Validity Perception) they perceived the test to be, and how clear (Clarity Perception) the
instructions for the test were on 7-point scales. Comparison-with-others questions asked
participants how well they would predict other participants would do on the same test (Other
Prediction) on a 7-point scale, and how similar they thought other participants were to
themselves (Other Similarity) on a 7-point scale. It should be noted that the attribution measures
were 5-point scales while other dependent measures were 7-point scales. The attribution
measures were directly adopted from previous research (see Taylor & Doria, 1981; Rosenfeld,
1990, for examples) in the hope of keeping the results comparable with established findings.
After participants had answered these questions, they received a message on the computer
screen which stated that their answers were saved. At this point the experiment was completed.
Participants were then probed for suspicion, fully debriefed and thanked.
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Results
Manipulation checks.
Self-standard manipulation. After viewing previous scores, participants were asked to
judge on a 10 point scale (1= 1-10, 10= 91-100) what a typical score would be in the integrative
ability test. The manipulation was effective, as demonstrated by the finding that participants who
viewed mostly high scores (between 60 and 100, out of 100) thought a typical score would be
significantly higher (M = 8.34, SD = .85, N = 56) than those who viewed mostly low scores
(between 20 and 60, out of 100) did (M = 4.74, SD = .85, N = 39), F(1, 93) = 383.98, p < .001,
ηp2 = .81.
Feedback type manipulation. After viewing previous scores (which were either high
scores or low scores), participants were asked to evaluate on a 7-point scale (1 = extremely poor,
7 = extremely well) how well they thought they did in the integrative ability test (i.e.,
self-evaluation). If the false feedback manipulation was effective, participants’ self-evaluation
after feedback should be influenced. Confirming this notion, feedback type had a significant
effect on self-evaluation, F(1, 93) = 41.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .91. Participants in the negative
feedback condition considered their performance to be worse (M = 3.32, SD = 1.30, N = 56) than
those in the positive feedback condition (M = 5.08, SD = 1.31, N = 39).
Analysis.
Seven dependent measures, including Ability Attribution, Effort Attribution, Luck
Attribution, Difficulty Perception, Test Evaluation, Other Prediction, and Other Similarity, were
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entered into Multivariate GLM (General Linear Model) in SPSS. Separate Univariate ANOVAs
generated from this analysis were focused on so as to examine the effect of feedback type on
these individual dependent measures. Descriptives and the effects of feedback type on each of
the dependent measures are shown in Table 2.
Main findings.
Attributions. Participants were asked to indicate on 5-point scales (1 = not at all, 5 =
extremely) the extent to which their ability (Ability Attribution), amount of effort they put into
taking the test (Effort Attribution), and luck (Luck Attribution) were responsible for their
performance. These specific dimensions have been used in many previous studies (e.g. Miller &
Ross, 1975; Weary-Bradley, 1978) and have been considered to be valid measures of causal
attributions (Elig & Frieze, 1979). Self-serving attributions are reflected by attributing negative
outcomes to external, uncontrollable factors such as bad luck and attributing positive outcomes
to internal, controllable factors such as ability and effort.
It was hypothesized that when receiving negative feedback, participants would be likely to
attribute poor performance to external factors such as luck while attributing positive feedback to
internal factors such as ability and effort. Consistent with such self-serving motivations,
feedback type had a significant effect on ability attribution, F(1, 93) = 8.85, p = .004, ηp2 = .09.
Participants who received negative feedback were less likely to attribute their test results to their
ability (M = 3.09, SD = 0.90), compared with those who received positive feedback (M = 3.64,
SD = 0.87). No such significant differences were found for other attributions. Although only
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marginally significant, the results for effort attribution were in the expected direction (p = .10),
where participants in the negative feedback condition (M = 3.36, SD = 0.90) attributed their
performance less to effort than those in the positive feedback condition (M = 3.64, SD = 0.67).
Participants seemed to have attributed both types of feedback to a similar amount of luck (p
= .90), which may be due to the possibility that there was a floor effect for luck attribution. That
is, the integrative ability test was conducted in such a way that luck probably did not seem to
play a role in affecting participants’ outcomes.
Test Perceptions. Participants were asked to indicate how difficult (Difficulty Perception),
fair (Fairness Perception) and valid (Validity Perception) they perceived the test to be, and how
clear (Clarity Perception) the instructions for the test were on 7-point scales. It was predicted that
participants would derogate the test (i.e., perceiving the test to be difficult, unfair, invalid, and
unclear) when responding to negative feedback and show an opposite behavioral pattern in
responding to positive feedback.
Three of the four dependent measures, Fairness Perception, Validity Perception, and Clarity
Perception, were found to be significantly correlated with each other (see Table 1, and note that
similar correlations among the three measures remain in Studies 2 and 3, see Tables 6 and 12,
respectively). And because these three variables were all measured on the same 7-point scale, for
the results section, these three variables were combined into one composite variable (Test
Evaluation) by computing the average of the three ratings. The measure for difficulty did not
show a consistent correlational relationship with the above three measures across the three
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studies. In addition, difficulty conceptually measures an aspect of the test distinct from fairness,
validity and clarity, because a test can be either easy or difficult despite being fair, valid and
clear. Therefore, ratings for the difficulty measure were reported separately in the results section.
Results for each of the four measures are listed in Appendix C.
Difficulty Perception. Feedback type did not have a significant effect on the difficulty
perception measure, p > .05.
Test Evaluation. Feedback type had a significant effect on the test evaluation average
measure, F(1, 93) = 13.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. Participants in the negative feedback condition
evaluated the test more negatively (M = 4.87, SD = 1.13), compared with those in the positive
feedback condition (M = 5.70, SD = 1.00).
Comparison-to-others. Participants were asked to indicate how well they would predict
other participants would do on the same test (Other Prediction) and how similar they thought
other participants were to themselves (Other Similarity) on 7-point scales. It was predicted that
negative feedback would trigger defensive social comparison to others, leading the participants
to derogate others and predicting that others would do similarly poorly, whereas positive
feedback would elicit opposite effects. The findings were not consistent with this prediction, in
that they showed that participants in the negative feedback condition were more likely to predict
that others would do well on the test (M = 4.71, SD = 1.19), compared with those in the positive
feedback condition (M = 3.97, SD = 1.16), F(1, 93) = 9.11, p = .003, ηp2 = .09. This result might
seem to contradict the prediction and the results already reported, but a closer examination of the
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particular design of this study allows a reconciliation between this result and the other data.
When asked “How well do you think other participants will do on the Integrative Ability test?”,
participants most likely referred to the previous scores they had viewed before the start the of the
task (see the Discussion section for more detailed reasoning). Therefore, this dependent variable
was treated as another manipulation check question in Studies 2 and 3. There was no significant
effect found for Other Similarity perception.
The results of Study 1 confirmed my hypotheses that when receiving this kind of internal,
negative performance feedback and responding in a private setting, participants would be more
likely than when receiving positive feedback to attribute poor performance to external factors,
and derogate the test (i.e., perceive the test to be unfair, invalid, and unclear).
Study 1 Discussion
Study 1 demonstrated that the novel kind of manipulation of false feedback employed in the
current research is effective in triggering different responses. As intended, showing previous
scores to participants for a limited time helped set up a prior expectation. Participants then
judged an invariant test result based on that expectation in deciding whether or not that result
indicated a positive outcome. As the data suggested, participants who viewed high previous
scores considered the test score to indicate failure, while those who viewed low previous scores
considered the same score to be a success. This manipulation evoked typical, self-serving
responses in the participants in response to failure feedback as opposed to success feedback.
Participants who judged their test scores to be a failure tended to externalize the outcome,
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considering the test to be less reflective of ability and evaluating the test more negatively than
those who judged the test scores to be a success. These findings are consistent with previous
false feedback research that suggests a general tendency for people to resort to self-defensive
strategies in the face of negative feedback, such as attributing failure to external factors (Miller
& Ross, 1975; Millimet & Gardner, 1972) and discrediting the task (Ditto & Lopez, 1992), etc.
Contrary to what would have been hypothesized, the failure feedback group predicted that
others would perform better than the success feedback group did. At first glance, one may
conclude from this result that participants who received failure feedback made less self-defensive
predictions about others’ performance than those who received success feedback. This
conclusion would have contradicted the other findings in Study 1 which showed greater
self-defensiveness in the failure feedback group. However, one explanation for this contradiction
may be due to the specific false feedback manipulation created in this study. Participants were
shown previous participants’ scores before the start the of the task, based on which they may
have reasonably inferred other participants’ performance when asked “How well do you think
other participants will do on the Integrative Ability test?” Therefore, this particular feedback
manipulation had an impact on participants’ impressions of other participants’ performance. This
post-study question, then, acted more as a manipulation check question tapping participants’
established understanding of other people’s outcomes than their reactions to their own outcome.
In Studies 2 and 3, this question was considered a manipulation check question rather than a
dependent variable.
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It should be noted that the effects observed in Study 1 may be mainly driven by female
participants given that over two thirds of the participants were female. Unfortunately the
unbalanced group size between the two genders did not allow an examination for the effect of
gender on the dependent measures. If anything, previous research has only occasionally reported
gender differences in the manifestation of self-serving biases (see Campbell & Sedekides, 1999
for a review), with men being more self-serving than women. Therefore, there is reason to infer
that with a more gender-balanced sample, more pronounced effects for Feedback Type would
have been observed.
Study 2
Study 1 demonstrated that, as expected, negative feedback administered via the procedure
developed for this research leads to more defensiveness (as assessed by the attribution and test
evaluation measures) than does positive feedback. Study 2 considered the effect of feedback
when it was responded to in public while assuming the presence of an audience that varied in
status. The procedure for Study 2 was identical to Study 1 up to the point when participants
received the score for the integrative ability task. One modification is that the previous scores
shown at the beginning of the test were high scores for all the participants in Study 2. Thus, all
participants in Study 2 received negative feedback. Unlike Study 1, which was conducted with
complete privacy, Study 2 involved responding to the feedback in a public setting where
participants were aware of an audience’s standards/expectations. Participants in Study 2 were
told that another participant of varying status held specific standards as to what was considered a
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good score on the integrative test. Participants were then told that their responses to the
post-study survey would be viewed by the other participant. Study 2 also adopted a priming
method from Lalwani and Shavitt (2009) to instill either a Western or an East Asian mode of
thinking in the participants by making either an IndeSC or an InterSC salient. In sum, Study 2
zeroed in on the negative feedback condition to see if contextual factors moderate the extent of
participants’ defensiveness, and furthermore, to see if they do so differently for participants with
independent versus interdependent self-construals.
Design and Rationale.
Study 2 followed a 2 (Prime: independent self-construal vs. interdependent self-construal) ×
2 (Other Status: High school student vs. Senior graduate student) × 2 (Other standard: high vs.
low) between-subject factorial design. This study introduced three new independent variables
(Prime, Other standard, and Other Status) and two new dependent variables (retest intention and
recall of feedback), and collected responses in a public situation for the following purposes.
First, priming participants to endorse either an independent or interdependent self-construal
helped create different cultural modes related to self-serving behaviors in various situations. The
independent – interdependent self-construal model is a more general extension of the
individualistic – collectivistic cultural distinction. The IndeSC is considered to be more prevalent
in individualistic cultures and is associated with concerns about self-esteem and distinguishing
one’s self from others, while the InterSC is more prevalent in collectivistic cultures and is
associated with less concern about self-esteem and more concern about connecting one’s self
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with others. The notion that the IndeSC and the InterSC coexist within both individualistic
cultures and collectivistic cultures has received wide recognition (Markus, & Kitayama, 1991;
Cross et al, 2011). Therefore, there is reason to infer from past cross-cultural research that within
any culture, people with an IndeSC will be more concerned about self-esteem than those with an
IndeSC. As a result, the IndeSC would be associated with more self-serving tendencies,
compared with the InterSC.
Second, audience’s status was introduced to examine contextual variations in self-esteem
concerns. Although participants did not directly interact with the audience in Study 2, they were
directed to respond to the dependent measures as if they were to communicate with the audience.
To a self-esteem-centered person, (i.e., possessing an IndeSC) not impressing a high status
audience poses a greater threat than not impressing a low status audience, because the high status
audience’s feedback carries greater importance for determining one’s self-worth than the low
status audience’s feedback. Conversely, a person who prioritizes interpersonal relationship and
social harmony (i.e., possessing an InterSC thus concerned about face) would express their
opinions about the task in a way that the status order in a given situation is upheld. Thus, it is
necessary to manipulate audience’s standard to create specific situations in which status order
may or may not be maintained.
Audience’s standard was manipulated such that whether the audience held a harsh standard
(high standard condition) or a lenient standard (low standard condition) in evaluating participants’
test outcome would convey additional failure or success feedback, respectively. A person who
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prioritizes self-esteem would be more defensive in response to another’s high standard than to a
low standard. This high reactivity to others’ standards would be manifested in strong self-serving
reactions. A person who does not prioritize self-esteem, on the other hand, would be more
accepting of others’ standards because self-esteem is not an immediate concern. After all,
defending against other people’s opinions in a public situation may put the other’s face at risk,
which does not fit with the InterSC.
Moreover, the notion of face would lead to the prediction that to a person with an InterSC
who deemphasizes self-esteem and focuses on interpersonal harmony, negative feedback from a
high-status audience holding a high standard would not be as humiliating as the same feedback
from a low-status audience. Thus, when a powerful audience is not impressed with such a person
(high standard condition), that person would be more inhibited about being self-serving.
Defensiveness when a low-status audience might think he or she performed poorly is especially
pronounced because when a low status audience thinks poorly of one, the loss of face is more
severe as one is supposed to be higher in esteem than the low status audience. On the other hand,
succeeding in a powerful audience’s eyes would be less expected than succeeding in a low-status
audience’s eyes. Succeeding by a low-status audience’s standard, instead, would not be
surprising because it corresponds to what a low-status person is supposed to do. Therefore, the
high-status audience’s low standard may elicit more inhibited self-serving behavior than the
low-status audience’s.
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The addition of audience’s standard is important because it helps clarify whether the people
with an InterSC may be just a little less self-serving in the presence of a high status audience
than a low status audience compared with the IndeSC people in general, or if they avoid being
self-serving at all in some situations despite being self-serving in other situations. For instance,
demonstrating that the InterSC people become more self-serving after failure (high standard
condition) than success (low standard condition) in the low-status audience’s eyes would provide
evidence for their self-serving tendencies. But their lack of self-serving tendencies in some
situations could be supported by demonstrating that their defensiveness after failure in the
powerful person’s eyes (the high standard condition) is no higher than it is when they succeeded
in the other’s eyes (the low standard condition).
Fourth, unlike Study 1 which was conducted with complete privacy, participants in Study 2
all responded to the post-study questionnaires in public (with an audience in mind). The concept
of face suggests that the public situation allows interpersonal concerns to surface and be
separated from self-esteem concerns. This is not suggesting that people do not have self-esteem
concerns in public. In fact, people should have both self-esteem and interpersonal concerns
whether in private or in public. However, in certain situations (e.g., in a collective culture and/or
with important others in the audience), interpersonal concerns are more easily identified and
distinguished from self-esteem concerns. In a public setting, acting in the service of interpersonal
harmony (which requires attention to interpersonal status) is more easily separable from acting to
uplift one’s self-esteem. Study 2 allows an examination of these distinct reactions.
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Finally, two new dependent measures were added to Study 2, namely retest intention and
recall of the detailed positive versus negative feedback interpretation. Retest intention was
assessed by asking participants to what degree they would like to take the test again in the future
on a 1-7 scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). It has been suggested that people are more
motivated by positive rather than negative outcomes. This question is added as one additional
measure for defensiveness to negative feedback as previous research (Miller & Hom, 1990)
showed that defensiveness is associated with lowered interest in being involved in the failed task
a second time. Recall of the detailed positive versus negative feedback interpretation was added
to help measure the spontaneous self-defensive tendencies participants possess in response to the
feedback. The procedure for assessing recall was adopted from Green and Sedikides (2000),
where participants were asked to recall in three minutes as many as they could the personality
behaviors that they had received as part of the feedback (see Appendix B for the complete list of
personality behaviors). All the participants answered the recall question at the very end of the
study based on the estimation that time between receiving the feedback and recalling the
feedback would be approximately equal for all the participants. This arrangement helped rule out
the possible confounding effects caused by different lengths of time lapses between feedback
presentation and recollection when the order of the recall question was otherwise randomized
with all other questions.
Hypotheses
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Study 2 involves feedback responding situations in which variations in self-serving reactions
may be examined. When a person prioritizes self-esteem (e.g., the IndeSC condition), he or she
would feel more threatened in front of a high status person than a low status person, especially
when the other person holds a high standard. The self-esteem centered person would then exhibit
more self-serving reactions in the presence of the high status audience than the low status
audience, especially when the audience holds a high standard. Self-serving reactions include
making external attributions, derogating the task in question, and recalling less negative than
positive feedback in response to failure feedback, while making internal attributions, praising the
task, and recalling no less negative than positive feedback in response to success feedback.
When a person deemphasizes self-esteem and focuses on interpersonal harmony (e.g., the
InterSC condition), his or her face would be threatened when a low status person rather than a
high status person thinks poorly of him or her (e.g., when that person holds a high standard), and
he or she would fear that the other person’s face is threatened when a high status person rather
than a low status person thinks highly of him or her (e.g., the low standard condition). In any
given interaction, the interactants are expected to act according to the hierarchical order and
protect the face of the person higher in status. For that reason, that person would exhibit more
self-serving reactions in the presence of the low status audience than the high status audience,
especially when the audience holds a high standard.
Given the manipulations in Study 2, the following hypotheses are tested (see Table 3):
1. There would be a main effect of prime type. People primed with the independent self will be
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overall more self-serving than people primed with the interdependent self.
2. There would be a main effect of other standard. In general, people would be more self-serving
when they learned that the other person thinks they did poorly than when they learned that the
other person thinks they did well.
3. Prime type would interact with other standard. People primed with an IndeSC would be more
self-serving in response to negative outcomes (i.e., when the audience holds a high standard)
than to positive outcomes (i.e., when the audience holds a low standard) to a greater extent than
those primed with an InterSC.
4. Prime type would interact with other status. Whether or not the audience holds a high standard,
those primed with an IndeSC would be more self-serving in reacting to a high-status audience
than a low-status audience, whereas those primed with an InterSC would inhibit self-serving
more severely in reacting to a high-status audience than a low-status audience.
5. There would be a three-way interaction between prime, other status, and other standard.
5a. The tendency for those primed with an IndeSC to be more self-serving in reacting to
others’ high standards than low standards would be magnified when the other is a high-status
person rather than a low-status person.
5b. Those primed with an InterSC would inhibit self-serving more readily in reacting to
others’ high standards than to their low standards, and this tendency would be magnified when
the other is a high-status person rather than a low-status person.
Participants. Similar to Study 1, an a priori power analysis using the software G*Power 3.1
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was conducted to determine an approximate sample size for Study 2. Given the three-factor
eight-level multivariate design in Study 2, the power analysis yielded an approximate sample
size between 150 and 450 to achieve a power of 0.9 in detecting a medium to small effect. The
approximate sample size required to achieve a power of 0.8 in detecting a medium to small effect
is between 120 to 360. Two hundred and fifty four Syracuse University students who enrolled in
the Fall 2015 semester Introductory Psychology class participated Study 2 for course credit. Two
participants’ data were excluded from the analysis because they withdrew from the study for
various involuntary reasons such as a fire drill or family emergencies. There were 114 males and
138 females. On average, 16.5 (out of 36, SD = 5.97, or 45.8%) of the Raven’s test items were
completed within the five minute time limit, of which an average of 9.4 (SD = 3.32, or 57.0%)
items were correct. 59.9% of the participants were Caucasians, 7.1% African Americans, 10.7%
Hispanics, 19.8% Asians, and 1.9% other ethnic groups.
Procedure. The procedure for viewing previous scores and receiving a score in Study 2 was
identical with Study 1, except that the previous scores were high scores for all the participants in
Study 2 (see Figure 4 for an illustration of the study procedure).
After participants received their own scores, they were also presented with what was framed
as a detailed interpretation of their scores. They were told that:
You may be wondering what your score really means. The computer will generate a more
detailed interpretation of what your score means. The computer will make specific
predictions of your behaviors, you know, things that your score indicates you would or would
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not do. You have 1.5 minutes to read over this feedback.
All the participants received the same paragraph of detailed feedback which contained
twelve sentences that describe a person’s behavior pertaining to the three critical personality
traits trustworthiness, kindness, and sociability either positively or negatively. The behaviors
were adopted from the Person Memory paradigm by Sedikides and his colleagues (Sedekides &
Green, 2000; see Appendix B). An example of positive behavior for the trait trustworthiness was
“You would follow through on a promise made to friends.”; and an example of negative behavior
in this category was “You would gossip about a good friend to other people.”
After participants received the paragraph of feedback, they were randomly assigned to
receive either an IndeSC prime or an InterSC prime. The prime task was described in such a way
that it led participants to believe that it tested a verbal aspect of integrative ability. The exact
wording was as follows:

“As you have read on the screen, now is another task that assesses a different aspect of
integrative ability. You will be asked to type things out on the computer. You have a
one-minute time limit on this. You will see more specific directions on the screen. Please
make sure you read the directions carefully. Please come out and see me when you are
done.”
(IndeSC prime) “A person’s self-concept derives from a belief in the wholeness and
uniqueness of internal attributes. The ultimate goal of a person’s life is to develop one’s
distinct potential and to self-actualize. A person should have the autonomy to express his/her
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unique configuration of needs, rights, and capacities. Now spend 1 minute to write down
thoughts about how you think you are different from your family and friends.”
(InterSC prime)“A person is fundamentally connected to others and share a common fate
with others. A person is part of an encompassing social relationship. A person’s behavior is
determined, contingent on the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others. Now spend 1 minute
to write down thoughts about how you think you are similar to your family and friends.”
A timer counting down from 60 seconds was kept visible on the computer screen when
participants were providing answers to the priming task. After the time ran out, participants were
told that they had completed the integrative ability test and would do a post-study survey.
The participant was directed out of the cubicle to receive the post-study survey. The
post-study survey session in Study 2 was different from Study 1 in that the survey was
administered while participants were made to believe that another participant would see their
responses. Some participants were told that the other participant was a senior graduate student
(high status other condition), whereas others were told that the other participant was a high
school student (low status other condition). As part of the cover story, participants were
presented with a computer screen with a message reading “sending initiation messages to room
507” while receiving the following instructions on the computer screen as well as from the
experimenter:
“We have another lab upstairs at room 507. Please wait while we communicate with the
other room. In the other lab room we are running the same study on some high school
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students (or senior graduate students who are finishing up their schooling and entering
professorship in various colleges in the coming year, in the senior graduate student
condition). Now there is a high school student (or a senior graduate student) who will be
taking the test soon, so what you fill out in the survey will be used to provide some info about
this study to that person. Please wait while I check if we are connected with the lab upstairs.”
The experimenter then acted as if he/she was checking the connections between the two lab
rooms, making noises using the keyboard and the mouse from a distance and sounding busy.
Then experimenter returned to the cubicle to tell the participants that the participant in the other
lab room had also viewed previous scores, so as to lead participants into thinking that the other
participant may or may not have adopted the same performance standard as they did. The
experimenter delivered the instructions:
“OK. We are connected with that lab and everything is ready. The student in the other
lab just reviewed previous participants’ scores like you did at the beginning. But don’t worry,
those do not include your result. The high school student (or graduate student) would not
know your score. That person also had only 1 minute. The other room will send some input
over soon. I will leave you to read the input privately.”
The experimenter then left the participant alone in the cubicle to “receive input from the
other lab room”. This is when participants were introduced to the other participant’s expectation
in terms of what he or she considered to be a good score. The participants randomly received one
of the two Other Standard condition manipulations. Participants in the high other standard
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condition learned that the other participant considered a score higher or equal to 80 to be a good
score, versus 40 in the low other standard condition. Since all participants viewed previous
scores ranging between 60 and 80 and received a score around 60 for themselves, they could
infer that their own result would not be considered a good score when considered in light of the
other person’s high standard, or would be considered a good score in comparison to the other
person’s low standard. Participants received the following directions from the experimenter:
“For your information, after reviewing previous participants' scores, the student in room 507
considers the following to be a good score for the integrative ability test: > 80 or = 80 (or >
40 or = 40, in the low other standard condition).”
After the participant had received the other standard manipulation, the experimenter
provided instructions about the dependent measures to bolster the cover story that the other
participant would be given the opportunity to view their answers. The participants were told
“Now is the actual survey. Keep in mind that the info you fill out will be sent over to the other
room, so the high school student (or senior graduate student) will have some knowledge
about it before they participate in the same study.”
Participants were then started on the dependent measures on the computer. Participants in
Study 2 received the same post-study survey as Study 1, except that the order in which survey
questions was presented was slightly modified. Participants always received the self –evaluation
question first, and the comparison-with-others questions last. Whether they received the
attribution measures or the test evaluation questions after the self-evaluation question was
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randomized. The order in which they received questions within each set of measures was also
randomized.
Lastly, participants were directed to complete the feedback recall task after being presented
with the following cover story:
“You read a detailed interpretation of your test score earlier. Although the high school
student (or graduate student) does not know what your score is, that person is allowed to
know what your score means. Please just type out your score interpretation that you can
remember from before, so that the high school student (or graduate student) can learn more
about the test. You have 3 minutes to recall the feedback.”
Participants were then instructed to recall the detailed feedback that followed their test score.
They were told that
“In the next page, we’re going to do a memory task. We know you weren’t asked to
memorize them, but we’d like you to type out all of the sentences that you can remember from
the interpretation of your test score. Even if you can’t remember them exactly, or you can just
remember a part of a sentence, it doesn’t matter—just put down what you can recall. You
have 3 minutes to do this."
Similar to Study 1, the order in which participants received the attribution questions and the
questions related to test quality was randomized. Participants always completed the recall task at
the end to avoid a situation in which what they recalled skewed their responses to the former two
sets of questions.
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Results
Analyses. Similar to the analyses for Study 1, seven dependent measures, including Ability
Attribution, Effort Attribution, Luck Attribution, Difficulty Perception, Test Evaluation, Other
Similarity, and Retest Intention were entered into a Multivariate GLM process. Separate
Univariate ANOVA analyses generated from this model were focused on to examine the effect
of Prime, Other Standard, and Other Status on individual dependent measures. An alpha level
of .05 was used for all the significance tests. Bonferroni correction was applied to multiple
comparisons where necessary.
Manipulation checks.
Self-standard manipulation. Similar to study 1, after viewing previous scores (which were
mostly high scores), participants were asked to judge on a 10 point scale (1= 1-10, 10 = 91-100)
what a typical score would be in the integrative ability test. The manipulation was effective, as
demonstrated by the finding that participants thought a typical score would be 7.79 on average
(N = 252, SD = 1.09) which was significantly higher than the midpoint (5.5 out of 10) of the
scale, t(251) = 33.6, p < .001. Similar to the result of the manipulation check for Study 1, this
result suggests that the manipulation of internal feedback was effective.
Other’s performance manipulation. As suggested by Study 1, the initially planned dependent
variable Other Prediction is more suitable to be considered another manipulation check question
due to the particular way in which false feedback was operationalized in this research. When
participants were asked to predict how well other participants would perform on the same task,
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they were likely to base their answers on the previous participants’ scores that they viewed at the
beginning of the task. In fact, the results showed that on average, participants predicted that other
participants would perform well on a 7-point scale, M = 4.68, SD = 1.23, N = 252. A one-sample
t-test showed that participants’ predictions were significantly higher than the middle point of the
scale (4 out of 7), t(251) = 8.80, p < .001. This result reflected the fact that all the participants
viewed very high previous participants’ scores in the case of Study 2.
Other’s Standard manipulation. After the participants were introduced to different prime,
other’s standard, and other’s status conditions, they were asked how well they thought they did
in the integrative ability test (self-evaluation) on a 7-point scale (1= extremely poor, 7 =
extremely well) as a manipulation check. The results showed that other standard was an effective
manipulation in that it had a main effect on self-evaluation, F(1, 243) = 16.96, p <.001.
Participants felt that they did worse (M = 3.38, SD = 1.46, N = 126) when the audience held a
high standard compared to the low-standard condition (M = 4.09, SD = 1.38, N = 126).
Main findings.
Attributions. The same set of measures for attributions from Study 1 were used in
Study 2. Participants were asked to indicate on 5-point scales (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely) the
extent to which their ability (Ability Attribution), amount of effort they put into taking the test
(Effort Attribution), and luck (Luck Attribution) were responsible for their performance.
The analysis revealed a Prime × Standard interaction for luck attribution (see Table 4 and
Figure 6), F(1, 244) = 3.95, p = .048, ηp2 = .016. No such interactions were found for the other
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three attributions. Multiple comparisons revealed that the IndeSC was associated with greater
defensiveness to other’s standard differentials, compared with the InterSC (consistent with
hypothesis 3). Specifically, participants primed with the IndeSC made significantly more luck
attributions when responding to the other’s high standard (M = 2.12, SD = 1.04) than the other’s
low standard (M = 1.72, SD = 0.89), F(1, 244) = 5.26, p = .023, ηp2 = .021. No such significant
differences were found for the InterSC participants. When the audience was perceived to hold a
low standard (indicating a positive outcome), the IndeSC group were significantly less likely to
believe it was due to luck (M = 1.72, SD = 0.89), compared with the Intersc group(M = 2.09, SD
= 0.94, F(1, 244) = 4.58, p = .033, ηp2 = .018 No such significant difference was found when the
audience held a high standard. Confirming my predictions, these results suggested that the
independent self tended to be more self-serving than the interdependent self in response to the
other’s standard differentials.
This two-way interaction was not qualified by a Prime × Standard× Status three-way
interaction for luck attribution(see Table 5 for the means in each condition). It was hypothesized
that the IndeSC group’s tendency to make more luck attributions in response to the audience’s
high standard (indicating negative external evaluation) than to an audience’s low standard
(indicating positive evaluation) would be more pronounced when the audience was a high-status
person than when it was a low-status person (hypothesis 5a). Unexpectedly, the data indicates
that this tendency was more prominent when the other was a low-status person rather than a
high-status person, as suggested by the significant simple comparison between the high-school
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high standard (M = 2.17, SD = 1.12) and high-school low standard conditions (M = 1.67, SD =
0.92), F(1, 244) = 4.67, p = .032, ηp2 = .019.
It was also hypothesized that the InterSC group’s tendency to refrain from making more luck
attributions in response to the audience’s high standard than low standard would be more
prominent when the audience is a high-status person than a low-status person (hypothesis 5b).
Again, the data suggest that this pattern was instead more prominent in the low-status condition
than the high-status condition. We found a marginal trend such that when the high school student,
but not the graduate student, held a low standard (indicating positive evaluation), the InterSC
group were more likely to attribute the result to luck (M = 2.12, SD = 1.02) than participants in
the IndeSC group (M = 1.67, SD = 0.92), F(1, 244) = 3.41, p = .056, ηp2 = .015. Other
comparisons were not significant.
Test Perceptions. Similar to Study 1, participants were asked to indicate how difficult
(Difficulty Perception), fair (Fairness Perception) and valid (Validity Perception) they perceived
the test to be, and how clear (Clarity Perception) the instructions for the test were on 7-point
scales. The three dependent measures, fairness perception, validity perception, and clarity
perception, were found to be significantly correlated with each other (Table 6). These three
variables were combined into one composite variable (Test Evaluation) by taking an average
among the three ratings. Results for each of the three variables are listed in Appendix C.
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Difficulty Perception. Similar to Study 1’s finding for difficulty perception, neither the
independent variables nor their interactions had a significant effect on the difficulty measure,
p > .05.
Test Evaluation. Prime had a marginally significant effect on test evaluation, F(1, 244) =
3.44, p = .065, ηp2 = .014. Participants evaluated the test more negatively when primed with an
IndeSC (M = 4.89, SD = 1.17, N = 125) than when primed with an InterSC (M = 5.16, SD = 1.05,
N = 127). Confirming hypothesis 1, this result suggests that the tendency for people to derogate
the test is more strongly associated with an IndeSC.
Other standard had a main effect on test evaluation, F(1, 244) = 8.64, p = .004, ηp2 = .34.
When the other held a high standard, participants considered to the test to be less fair, valid, or
clear (M = 4.81, SD = 1.15) than when the other held a low standard (M = 5.24, SD = 1.04). This
result was consistent with hypothesis 2.
Unlike the results for luck attribution, the Prime × Standard interaction for test evaluation
was not significant (see Table 7 for the means in each level of the conditions), p = .70, although
there was a descriptive trend similar to that for luck attribution. The other’s different standard
seemed to have a greater influence on the test evaluation of the IndeSC group than the InterSC
group.
The overall Prime × Other Standard × Other Status interaction was not significant for test
evaluation either (p = .91, see Table 8 for the means in each level of the conditions). One simple
comparison suggested that when responding to the high school student (low status audience), the
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independent self evaluated the test significantly more negatively in the high standard condition
(M = 4.65, SD = 1.12) than the low standard condition (M = 5.20, SD = 1.22), F(1, 244) = 4.30, p
= .039, ηp2 = .017. No such significant difference was found for the IndeSC group in the
high-status other condition, or for the InterSC group in either the high or low status other
condition.
Other Similarity. When asked how similar they thought other participants were to
themselves (other similarity) on a 7-point scale, participants in different conditions did not
answer differently. In other words, the independent variables in the current study had no
significant impact on this particular dependent variable.
Retest Intention. As an added dependent measure in Study 2, participants were asked
whether they would be interested in taking the same test again in the future on a 7-point scale.
Prime and other’s standard interacted to influence retest intention (see Table 9 and Figure 7),
F(1, 244) = 3.84, p = .05, ηp2 = .015. Participants primed with the IndeSC were less willing to
take the test again when responding to the other’s high standard (M = 3.14, SD = 0.93) than the
other’s low standard (M = 3.50, SD = 1.03), F(1, 244) = 3.86, p = .051, ηp2 = .016. When the
audience was perceived to hold a high standard (suggesting a negative outcome), the IndeSC
participants were significantly less willing to take the test again (M = 3.14, SD = 0.93), compared
with the InterSC participants (M = 3.52, SD = 0.96), F(1, 244) = 3.82, p = .047, ηp2 = .016. These
results were consistent with Hypothesis 3.
The two-way interaction revealed above was not qualified by a Prime × Standard× Status
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three-way interaction (see Table 10 for the means in each level of the conditions). It was
predicted that the tendency for the IndeSC participants to express higher levels of interest in
taking the test again after receiving the audience’s low standard than high standard would be
more pronounced in the high status other condition than the low status other condition
(hypothesis 5a). However, a significant pairwise comparison suggested that this tendency was
more pronounced in the low status other condition than the high status other condition, high
standard (M = 2.97, SD = 0.99) vs. low standard (M = 3.52, SD = 1.06), F(1, 244) = 5.02, p
= .023, ηp2 = .021.
It was also hypothesized that the higher levels of interest in taking the test again shown by
the InterSC participants relative to the IndeSC participants in response to the audience’s high
standard would be magnified in the high-status other condition. However, the data suggested that
this contrast was magnified in the low-status other condition (InterSC group (M = 3.58, SD =
0.92) vs. IndeSC group (M = 2.97, SD = 0.98)), F(1, 244) = 7.00, p = .009, ηp2 = .028.
Recall. Recall data was coded based on a “gist” criterion by two independent coders.
Inter-rater reliability was r = .89 for recall of the positive sentences and r = .90 for the negative
sentences. Given the high agreement between the two coders, the average ratings taken between
the two coders were entered for the analysis. Only correctly recalling the specific behavior that
was presented was considered correct recall. The free recall data were then analyzed through a
Repeated Measure Mixed ANOVA with positivity of the behavior entered as the repeated
measure and Prime, Other status, and Other Standard entered as the between-subject factors.
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In general, participants recalled more positive (M = 2.68, SD = 1.12) than negative behavior
(M = 2.45, SD = 1.11), F(1, 211) = 3.69, p = .056, ηp2 = .017. This result is consistent with
previous research where people were found to recall less negative than positive self-relevant
information. In follow-up analyses, no other significant main or interactive effects on recall were
found.
Study 2 Summary and Discussion
Study 2 primarily demonstrated that the three factors derived from examining the concept
of face, self-construal, audience’s standards, and audience’s status, have an impact on how
people react to feedback in a public situation. All the participants received a negative test
outcome in Study 2, but when they noticed that an audience held a different standard than their
own, they became more self-serving (e.g., blaming the test) when the audience held a high
standard than a low standard. This effect was moderated by self-construal type and status. I
found that people primed with an IndeSC tended to be more self-serving than those primed with
an InterSC in response to an audience’s standard differentials, especially in some situations (e.g.,
facing a low-status audience).
Specifically, the IndeSC group was found to be more likely to attribute a negative test
outcome to luck, derogate the test, express less interest in taking the failed test again when they
noticed an audience held a high standard than a low standard, compared with the interdependent
participants. These results suggest that those primed with an IndeSC were more concerned about
the consequences of the test experience for their self-esteem than the interdependent participants.
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When the audience held a high standard, the independent participants felt compelled to defend
their self-views in the face of others’ negative evaluations. When the audience held a low
standard, on the other hand, the independent self was sensitive to the signal that they might have
not done as poorly, and they were ready to embrace the audience’s positive evaluation.
Although all the participants showed a general tendency to be more self-serving in the face
of the audience’s high standard than a low standard, the InterSC group was found to inhibit
self-serving tendencies in many cases. The interdependent participants’ tendency to make luck
attributions for the negative test outcome in the face of the audience’s different standards was
similar to that of the independent participants. But if anything, descriptively, the interdependent
participants were less likely to make luck attributions for the negative test outcome when they
noticed that the audience’s standard became more harsh, which is a pattern opposite to that of the
independent participants. The interdependent participants also showed higher, rather than lower,
interest in taking the failed test again when the audience held a high standard than a low standard,
which supports my prediction of inhibited self-serving tendencies. On the Test Perception
measure, the InterSC group did not derogate the test as much as the IndeSC group did. They also
seemed to have displayed less reactivity in terms of evaluating the test when responding to the
audience’s different standards (not significantly but descriptively).
The audience’s status also came into play in Study 2, in which participants made their
responses believing that the audience would view their answers. I hypothesized that when the
audience was a high-status person rather than a low-status person, the tendency for those primed
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with an IndeSC to be more self-serving toward the audience’s high standard than toward its low
standard would be more pronounced. However, unexpectedly, the data revealed that this
tendency was more pronounced when the audience was a low-status instead of a high-status
person. For example, participants primed with the IndeSC believed their performance was more
likely to be due to luck, evaluated the test more negatively, and showed less interest in taking the
test again when they found that a low status audience held a high standard rather than a low
standard). No such contrast was found for the IndeSC group when the audience was a high status
person.
Some evidence was found for the inhibited self-serving reaction predictions for the InterSC
participants in the high-status audience condition. Although the difference was marginal, the
InterSC group evaluated the test less negatively than the IndeSC group did when the audience
held a high standard, and more positively than the IndeSC group when the audience held a low
standard, and this was especially the pattern in the high-status audience condition rather than the
low-status audience condition.
Inconsistent with my hypotheses, however, patterns contradicting strengthened inhibited
self-serving reactions in front of a high status audience were found on the luck attribution and the
retest intention measures. When the audience held a low standard (indicating positive external
evaluation), the InterSC group made more luck attributions than the IndeSC group and expressed
less interest in retaking the test than the IndeSC group, a tendency to inhibit self-serving; but it
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was especially the case when the audience was a low-status person rather than a high-status
person.
Note that across all the dependent measures, the data in Study 2 did not lend support for the
prediction that the interdependent participants would inhibit self-serving more strongly in
reacting to the audience’s high standard than low standard. The interdependent participants did
inhibit self-serving when compared with the independent participants; but they were similar to
the independent participants in terms of being more self-serving in response to the audience’s
high standard than low standard.
To sum up, Study 2 suggested that the self-construal prime manipulation was effective in
triggering different reactions to feedback. It demonstrated that the IndeSC was associated with
higher levels of self-serving tendencies in response to an audience’s high standard than low
standard, whereas the InterSC was associated with higher levels of inhibited self-serving
tendencies. However, the status manipulation did not have an impact on participants’ reactions as
intended. If anything, the different pattern of reactions between the IndeSC participants and the
InterSC participants was unexpectedly magnified when the audience was a low status person,
rather than a high status person.
Study 3
Study 2 introduced the audience’s standard, which in some cases differed from participants’
own standards. Others’ standards are relevant in discussing self-esteem concerns versus
interpersonal concerns, in that they help clarify whether people with InterSCs would be
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self-serving at all (see Study 2’s hypotheses). Study 2 suggested that the InterSC participants
reacted less self-servingly than the IndeSC participants in response to the audience’s high
standard versus low standard. This finding implies that the InterSC participants inhibited
self-serving tendencies on some of the response measures compared with the IndeSC participants.
However, it is possible that the reason why the InterSC participants in Study 2 inhibited
self-serving tendencies in some conditions was because they received an overwhelmingly
negative test outcome which overrode the potential positive influence of the audience’s lenient
standard. It is not immediately clear from Study 2 whether the InterSC people do not self-serve
at all even in the face of success feedback.
In order to overcome the limitations of Study 2, Study 3 was designed with a feature that
allowed a direct examination of the InterSC participants’ self-serving tendencies in the face of
positive feedback. Study 3 involved situations in which participants faced a direct conflict
between self-esteem needs and interpersonal needs. Two contrasting feedback type conditions
were created in Study 3 to elicit this conflict. Rather than presenting the participants with the
audience’s standards, half of the participants in Study 3 were led to believe that they failed the
test and found that an audience succeeded in the same test. In this situation, one could seek
immediate remedy to self-esteem, whether it be derogating the test or externalizing the result, but
doing so runs the risk of invalidating the other person’s success. The other half of the
participants in Study 3 received feedback which indicated that they succeeded in the test while
the audience failed. A person who focuses on social harmony would help the failed audience

68

restore a positive feeling by downplaying the validity of the test or externalizing the outcome
even if it meant that the positive implications of their own success would have been lessened.
Putting the participants in a situation where there was always a discrepancy between the
participant's performance and another person's performance would conveniently increase the face
concerns of interdependent participants. This manipulation of feedback type is also ecologically
valid, because people typically receive evaluative information about their performances in a
social context where others are performing at different levels.
Publicness of feedback responding situations was also manipulated. Unlike Study 1 which
was conducted in private, or Study 2 in which participants all responded believing that their
answers would be viewed by another person, in Study 3, half of the participants responded to the
post-study questionnaire in a private situation similar to Study 1, whereas the other half
responded in a public situation similar to Study 2. While it is known that self-esteem concerns
are associated with varied self-serving tendencies in public than in private (e.g., Schlenker,
Weigold, & Hallam, 1990; Schneider, 1969; Smith & Whitehead, 1993), it is not clear how
publicness of the situation would affect the self-serving levels of those with social harmony
concerns (i.e., face concerns). It is even less clear how the comparison and contrast of
self-serving levels between people with different self-construals is influenced by publicness.
Therefore, manipulation of publicness is necessary for addressing these questions.
Unlike Study 2 where the audience was either a high status person or a low status person,
Study 3 focused on the high status audience condition. All the participants in the public condition
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were told that their responses would be viewed by a senior graduate student. The status
manipulation in Study 2 seemed to suggest that the low status audience (although unexpected)
rather than the high status audience had a greater impact on participants’ reactions. However,
those results were hard to interpret because it wasn’t clear that participants in Study 2 perceived
the graduate student as higher in status than the high school student. Therefore, the high status
audience condition was focused in Study 3 as both theories of self-enhancement and the notion
of face would suggest that the high status audience manipulation would be the more face valid
operationalization in eliciting either self-serving or inhibited self-serving tendencies.
Design. Study 3 followed a 2 (Feedback type: Self-Succeed Grad-Fail vs. Self-Fail
Grad-Succeed) × 2 (Prime: independent self-construal vs. interdependent self-construal) × 2
(Publicness: public vs. private) between-subject factorial design.
Procedure. The study procedure for the public condition was identical to Study 2, with the
following exceptions (See Figure 5 for an illustration of the study procedure):
a. Like Study 2, Study 3 also involved introducing the alleged “other person” to the actual
participants. Differently from Study 2, the “other participant” in Study 3 was always a senior
graduate student (High Status).
b. Rather than presenting participants with the graduate student’s standard, participants were
presented with the graduate student’s (allegedly) actual performance. Participants were told that
the graduate student had completed the integrative ability test and were shown that person’s
score which was fabricated and manipulated by the experimenter. Two feedback conditions were
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created this way: Self-Succeed Grad-Fail feedback (SSGF) and Self-Fail Grad-Succeed feedback
(SFGS). For the SSGF feedback, participants were shown low previous scores (between 20 and
60) before their own task started, and thus were provided with a low self-expectation. After
being presented with their own results (around 60) when the task was completed, they were led
to believe that the senior graduate student received a score lower than their own (around 40,
which was around the average of previous scores). For the SFGS feedback, participants were
shown high previous scores (between 60 and 100) before the task started, and thus were provided
with a high self-expectation. After being presented with their own results (around 60) when the
task was completed, they were led to believe that the senior graduate student received a score
much higher than their own (around 80, which was around the “norm” of previous scores).
c. Different from Study 1 in which participants responded to the post-study questionnaires in
a completely private and confidential setting, or Study 2 in which participants responded in a
public situation, the publicness of the situation in which participants answered post-study
questions in Study 3 was manipulated. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to the
public condition while the other half to the private condition. The procedure for the public
condition was identical to Study 2, where participants answered post-study measures believing
that their answers would be viewed by the senior graduate student. In the private condition,
participants were told that their answers would be kept anonymous. Specifically, they were told
that
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(Private condition)“Before you leave, please fill out this anonymous post-study survey. Your
responses will not be disclosed to anyone and will only be used for archival purposes.”
Hypotheses.
Predictions for Study 3 are laid out in Table 11. In Study 3, participants found that either
they themselves failed the test and performed below the norm while a high status other
succeeded and performed above the norm (i.e., the SFGS feedback condition), or that they
themselves succeeded in the test and performed above the norm while a high status other failed
and performed below the norm (i.e., the SSGF feedback condition). Participants were then told to
reflect upon and describe their experience in the form of the post-study questionnaire, either in
response to the high status person or in private. The publicness manipulation coupled with the
self-construal prime allows for the examination of conditions in which self-esteem concerns or
other’s welfare concerns would each differentially manifest.
As the concept of face would suggest, the interdependent self would be more closely
associated with caring for the face of another person (especially a high-status other, such as a
graduate student) than the independent self would, and this tendency would be more prominent
in public than in private. Behavior in favor of the other’s welfare would be aimed at protecting
the other person’s image and avoiding humiliating moments for the other person. When a person
succeeds in a test the other person fails, he/she would protect the other person’s feelings by
externalizing his/her own success and invalidating the test to make the person look and feel
better. When a person fails in a test the other person succeeds, he/she would uphold the other
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person’s face by internalizing his/her own failure and praising the test to legitimize the other
person’s success. In contrast, people who prioritize self-esteem over another person’s face (i.e.,
those primed with the IndeSC) will react defensively to protect their own welfare. Specifically,
the following hypotheses were tested:
1. As hypothesized for Study 2, there would be a main effect for prime type. People would show
more self-serving responses when primed with an independent self than when primed with an
interdependent self, making external attributions, derogating the test and derogating other people
in comparison.
2. There would be a main effect for feedback type. People in the SFGS condition would be more
self-serving in general than those in the SSGF condition. This pattern would confirm past false
feedback research which has consistently suggested that failure feedback evokes more
self-defensive responses than success feedback.
3. Prime type would interact with feedback type. Compared with those primed with an InterSC,
those primed with an IndeSC would react more negatively to failure feedback, and more
positively to success feedback.
4. Prime type would interact with Publicness. Whether receiving SFGS or SSGF feedback, those
primed with an IndeSC would be more self-serving in public than in private, whereas those
primed with an InterSC would be less self-serving in public than in private.
5. There would be a Prime × Feedback Type × Publicness interaction.
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5a. The tendency for the independent self to react more defensively to the SFGS feedback
than to the SSGF feedback would be magnified in the public situation as opposed to the private
situation.
5b. The interdependent self would be self-serving in private where they would react more
defensively to the SFGS feedback than to the SSGF feedback, but their self-serving tendencies
toward both types of feedback in private would be weaker than the independent self. Importantly,
the interdependent self would inhibit self-serving tendencies in public, and they would be more
likely to inhibit self-serving tendencies when reacting to the SFGS feedback than to the SSGF
feedback in public.
Participants. Given the similar experimental design to Study 2, an a priori power analysis
generated for Study 3 the same sample size recommendations as that in Study 2. That is, an
approximate sample size between 150 and 450 is required to achieve a power of 0.9 in detecting
a medium to small effect. The approximate sample size required to achieve a power of 0.8 in
detecting a medium to small effect is between 120 to 360. A total of 357 college students
participated in Study 3, among which 166 students were from Syracuse University and 191
students were recruited though Mechanical Turk. Forty-four (23.0%) participants’ data from the
Mechanical Turk pool were considered invalid because those participants took an unusual length
of time (shorter than fifteen minutes or longer than an hour) for the study. Four participants’ data
(2.1%) from the Mechanical Turk pool were considered invalid because they did not finish the
task even if they passed the time length criterion. A total of 309 participants’ data, including all
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of the 166 participants’ data collected at Syracuse University and 143 participants’ data collected
through Mechanical Turk, entered the analysis. In the Syracuse University student sample, the
mean age was 20.1 (SD = 8.51) years old. There were 80 males, 85 females, and 1 “other”
gender. On average, 17.6 (out of 36, SD = 7.20, or 48.9%) of the Raven’s test items were
completed within the five minute time limit, of which an average of 9.9 (SD = 3.67, or 56.3%)
items were correct. 55.1% of the participants were Caucasians, 9.5% African Americans, 3.0%
Hispanics, 25.7% Asians, 1.2% Native Americans, and 4.8% other ethnic groups. In the MTurk
student sample, the mean age was 24.6 (SD = 6.44) years old. There were 67 males, 73 females,
and 3 “other” genders. On average, 15.0 (out of 36, SD = 10.84, or 41.7%) of the Raven’s test
items were completed within the five minute time limit, of which an average of 9.27 (SD = 4.38,
or 61.8%) items were correct. 63.1% of the participants were Caucasians, 13.5% African
Americans, 7.1% Hispanics, 11.3% Asians, 2.1% Native Americans, 0.7% Pacific Islanders, and
2.1% other ethnic groups.
Results.
Analyses. The data for Study 3 were analyzed in a similar manner as Study 2. Seven
dependent measures, including Ability Attribution, Effort Attribution, Luck Attribution,
Difficulty Perception, Test Evaluation, Other Similarity, and Retest Intention were entered into
separate Univariate ANOVA analyses to examine the effect of Prime, Publicness, and Feedback
Type on these individual measures. As in Study 2, the variable Test Evaluation was constructed
by taking an average of the ratings for Fairness Perception, Validity Perception, and Clarity
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Perception, because these ratings are closely correlated with each other (see Table 12). Results
for each of the three variables separately are listed in the Appendix C. An alpha level of .05 was
be used for all the significance tests. Bonferroni correction was applied to multiple comparisons.
Results did not differ whether the data was collected in the lab or on MTurk, therefore, data from
the two sources were combined.
Manipulation checks.
Self-standard manipulation. Like Study 2, participants were asked to judge on a 10 point
scale (1= 1-10, 10= 91-100) what a typical score would be in the integrative ability test right
after viewing previous scores (either mostly high or mostly low scores). This question was used
to make sure participants did in fact process the information conveyed by previous scores. This
manipulation was effective, as demonstrated by the finding that those who viewed high previous
scores expected a typical score to be significantly higher (M = 9.06, SD = 0.62, N = 160) than
those who viewed low previous scores (M = 5.55, SD = 1.25, N = 149), F(1, 307) = 801.21, p
< .001.
Other’s performance manipulation. Similar to Studies 1 and 2, the initially planned
dependent variable Other Prediction was treated as another manipulation check question because
of the close association between viewing previous participants’ scores and predicting other
participants’ performance. The result is consistent with both Study 1 and Study 2; those who
viewed low previous scores tended to predict other participants’ performance would be
significantly lower (M = 4.44, SD = 1.13, N = 147) than those who viewed high previous scores
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did (M = 4.78, SD = 1.19, N = 159), F(1, 304) = 6.70, p = .01. Notice that there were 3 missing
data points in the Other Prediction ratings, resulting in a total number of 306 ratings.
Feedback Type manipulation check. After the participants were introduced to different
publicness, prime, and other’s performance conditions, they were asked how well they thought
they did in the integrative ability test (self-evaluation) on a 7-point scale (1= extremely poor, 7 =
extremely well).
The feedback in the current study was manipulated so that participants in the SFGS feedback
condition saw high previous scores first, then found they failed the task, and later were told that
the graduate student succeeded in the same task; those in the SSGF feedback condition saw low
previous scores first, then found they succeeded in the task, and later were told that the graduate
student failed. The results showed that feedback type had a significant effect on self-evaluation,
F(1, 292) = 119.6, p < .001. Participants in the SFGS feedback condition considered their
performance to be worse (M=3.21, SD = 1.45, N = 156) than those in the SSGF feedback
condition did (M = 4.94, SD = 1.25, N = 144). These results confirmed that the manipulation for
feedback type was significantly affecting participants’ self-evaluation.
Main findings.
Attributions. Similar to Studies 1 and 2, participants were asked to indicate on 5-point
scales (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely) the extent to which their ability (Ability Attribution),
amount of effort they put into taking the test (Effort Attribution), and luck (Luck Attribution)
were responsible for their performance in the post-feedback questionnaire.
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It was found that ability attribution was significantly influenced by feedback type, F(1, 295)
= 6.28, p = .013, ηp2 = .021; so was effort attribution, F(1, 295) = 6.94, p = .01, ηp2 = .023. No
such effects were found for luck attribution. Participants in the SFGS feedback condition were
less likely to attribute their results to ability (M = 3.15, SD = 1.09 vs. the SSGF feedback
condition, M = 3.44, SD = 0.84) or effort (M = 3.19, SD = 1.00, vs. the SSGF feedback condition,
M = 3.51, SD = 0.88). These results showed that participants who received the failure (other
succeeded) feedback tended to be more self-serving, compared with those who received the
success (other failed) feedback. These results supported hypothesis 2, suggesting that failure
feedback in general evoked more self-defensive responses than success feedback.
In Study 3, half of the participants responded to the post-feedback questionnaires in a
completely private setting which was a similar setup as Study 1 (private condition), whereas the
other half responded with the assumption that the graduate student would view their answers,
which was similar to Study 2 (public condition). Publicness had a significant influence on ability
attribution, F(1, 295) = 4.03, p = .046, ηp2 = .013, and effort attribution (F(1, 295) = 10.69, p
= .001, ηp2 = .035. No such effects were found for luck attribution. Participants who answered
post-feedback questions in a public situation were less likely to attribute their test results to
ability (M = 3.17, SD = 0.95 vs. private condition, M = 3.40, SD = 1.00) or effort (M = 3.14, SD =
0.99 vs. M = 3.51, SD = 0.91 in the private condition) than those in the private condition. Other
main effects of publicness were not significant. These results seem to suggest that participants
were less likely to attribute their outcome to internal factors such as ability and effort in public
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than in private. But because the participants either received a desirable outcome or an
undesirable performance outcome, it is not clear whether the participants were more or less
self-serving in public than in private.
There was not a significant main effect for prime on the attribution measures, nor were there
any significant two-way interactions between prime and feedback type on those measures. The
Prime × Publicness × Feedback Type interaction was not significant for ability attribution (p
= .73, see Table 13 for the means in each level of the conditions). Nonetheless, this three way
interaction was noticeable for effort attribution (see Table 14), F(1, 295) = 2.44, p = .12, ηp2
= .008. Pairwise comparisons suggested that the IndeSC participants made significantly more
effort attribution for the SSGF feedback (M = 3.88, SD = 0.82) than for the SFGS feedback (M =
3.28, SD = 1.13) in the private situation, F(1, 295) = 9.18, p = .003, ηp2 = .030. No such
significant difference was found for the interdependent participants in private, providing some
support for my hypothesis that the IndeSC participants would react more defensively than the
InterSC participants to different types of feedback in the private situation. The IndeSC
participants also made significantly more effort attribution for the SSGF feedback in the private
(M = 3.88, SD = 0.82) than the public condition (M = 3.13, SD = 1.01), F(1, 295) = 11.87, p
= .001, ηp2 = .039. This pattern, however, contradicts my hypothesis that there would be a
stronger self-serving tendency for the IndeSC participants in the public situation rather than in
the private situation. No other pairwise comparisons were found significant.
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Test Perception. Similar to Studies 1 and 2, the three dependent measures, Fairness
Perception, Validity Perception, and Clarity Perception, were combined into one composite
variable (Test Evaluation) by taking an average among the three ratings because those were
found to be closely correlated with each other (see Table 12). Results for each of the three
variables are listed in the Appendix C.
Difficulty Perception. Similar to the finding for difficulty perception in Studies 1 and 2,
neither the independent variables nor their interactions had a significant effect on this measure,
p > .05.
Test Evaluation. Feedback type had a significant effect on test evaluation, F(1, 295) =18.7, p
< .001, ηp2 = .059. Participants in the SFGS feedback condition were more likely to derogate the
test (M = 4.70, SD = 1.10) than those in the SSGF feedback condition (M = 5.24, SD = 1.06).
Other main effects of feedback type were not significant.
Publicness of the situation had a significant effect on test evaluation, F(1, 295) = 6.38, p
= .012, ηp2 = .021. Participants who answered dependent measure questions in a public situation
were more likely to derogate the test (M = 4.76, SD = 1.12, vs. M = 5.11, SD = 1.08) than those
in the private condition.
Prime and feedback type interacted to affect test evaluation (see Table 15 and Figure 8), F(1,
295) = 5.54, p = .019, ηp2 = .018. Multiple comparisons suggested that people primed with the
InterSC did not perceive the test to be significantly different whether reacting to the SFGS or
SSGF feedback, p > .05. People primed with the IndeSC, on the contrary, rated the test
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significantly more negatively when receiving the SFGS feedback (M = 4.59, SD = 1.13) than
when receiving the SSGF feedback (M = 5.43, SD = 0.90), F(1, 295) = 22.18, p < .001, ηp2
= .070, which confirmed hypothesis 2. Participants in the IndeSC condition (M = 5.43, SD = 0.90)
rated the test more positively than participants in the InterSC condition (M = 4.99, SD = 1.64)
after receiving the SSGF feedback, F(1, 295) = 4.92, p = .027, ηp2 = .016. Other multiple
comparisons were not significant.
For test evaluation, the two-way interaction revealed above was not qualified by a Prime ×
Feedback type × Publicness three-way interaction (p = .93, see Table 16 for the means in each
level of the conditions). It was hypothesized that the tendency for the IndeSC participants to
react more defensively to the SFGS feedback than to the SSGF feedback would be magnified in
the public situation as opposed to the private situation. While the IndeSC participants rated the
test more negatively after receiving the SFGS feedback than the SSGF feedback in both the
public (SFGS, M = 4.36, SD = 1.58, vs. SSGF feedback, M = 5.29, SD = 0.88, F(1, 295) = 12.03,
p = .001, ηp2 = .039) and private (SFGS, M = 4.79, SD = 1.16, vs. SSGF feedback, M = 5.52, SD
= .88, F(1, 295) = 10.20, p = .002, ηp2 = .033) conditions, there was only a descriptive trend for
this tendency to be more pronounced in the public condition than in the private condition.
Other Similarity. Similar to Study 2 results, when asked how similar they thought other
participants were to themselves (Other Similarity) on a 7-point scale, the participants in different
conditions did not answer differently.
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Retest Intention. Participants were asked whether they would be interested in taking the
same test again in the future on a 7-point scale.
Publicness of the situation had a marginally significant effect on and retest intention, F(1,
295) = 3.03, p = .083, ηp2 = .010. Participants who answered dependent measure questions in a
public situation expressed less interest in taking the same test again (M = 3.32, SD = 1.14) than
those in the private condition (M = 3.57, SD = 1.07) did.
Prime and feedback type interacted to affect participants’ interest in taking the same test
again (see Table 17 and Figure 9), F(1, 295) = 8.26, p = .004, ηp2 = .027. When the IndeSC was
primed (M = 3.84, SD = 0.96), participants were more willing to take the test again after
receiving the SSGF feedback, compared with the InterSC participants (M = 3.25, SD = 1.21), F(1,
295) = 8.90, p = .003, ηp2 = .029. In addition, although feedback type did not significantly affect
people’s intention to retake the test when they were primed with the InterSC, p > .05, those
primed with the IndeSC were significantly less willing to take the test again after receiving the
SFGS (M = 3.24, SD = 1.06) rather than the SSGF feedback (M = 3.83, SD = 0.96), F(1, 295) =
9.63, p = .002, ηp2 = .032, which, again, confirmed hypothesis 2.
The two-way interaction was not qualified by a Prime × Feedback type × Publicness
three-way interaction (p = .32, see Table 18 for the means in each level of the conditions). It was
predicted that the tendency for the IndeSC participants to showed higher level of interest in
taking the test again after receiving the SSGF feedback than the SFGS feedback would be more
pronounced in the public condition than the private condition (see Hypothesis 5a). However, the
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only significant simple comparison suggested that this tendency was especially pronounced in
the private condition instead (SSGF feedback, M = 3.94, SD = 0.93, vs. SFGS feedback, M =
3.17, SD = 1.13), F(1, 295) =10.85, p = .001, ηp2 = .035.
Recall. Recall data were coded and analyzed using the same procedure as in Study 2.
Inter-rater reliability was r = .86 for recall of the positive sentences and r = .97 for the negative
sentences. Only correctly recalling the specific behavior that was presented was considered
correct recall. Free recall data were analyzed through a Repeated Measure Mixed ANOVA with
positivity of the behavior being the repeated measure and prime, publicness, and feedback type
being the between-subject factors.
There was a marginally significant effect for positivity of the behavior sentences on the
amount of free recall, which showed that participants recalled more positive (M = 2.37, SD =
1.33) than negative behavior (M = 2.22, SD = 1.27), F(1, 284) = 3.16, p = .077, ηp2 = .011.
There was a significant Positivity × Prime × Publicness interaction effect on the amount of
free recall (see Table 19 and Figure 10), F(1, 284) = 3.88, p = .050, ηp2 = .013. Pairwise
comparisons showed that when responding in public, participants in the IndeSC group recalled
significantly more positive self-relevant behavior (M = 2.61, SD = 1.34) than negative behavior
(M = 2.17, SD = 1.01), F(1, 284) = 4.87, p = .028, ηp2 = .017. Other pairwise comparisons were
not significant.
Study 3 Summary and Discussion
Study 3 aimed at examining how people react to feedback in comparison with another
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person’s performance in either a public or a private situation, and how their responses were
influenced by their self-construal. The participants first compared their own performance to a
pre-established “norm” and then found that another person either performed better or worse than
them in the same task. The other person was described as a higher status person (a senior
graduate student) in order to maximize the possible effect of caring for that person’s welfare.
Participants were then asked about attributions for their outcomes, perception of the task, and
motivation to take the test again either in private or in public (knowing that the audience would
view their responses).
The nature of feedback had a general impact on how people reacted to that feedback. All the
participants in Study 3 showed an average tendency to be more self-serving after receiving
failure feedback than success feedback. They assumed less personal responsibility and rated the
test more negatively for the failure feedback than the success feedback for themselves,
presumably to defend a positive self-view.
Publicness of the situation in which participants responded to the feedback mattered.
Whether for the failure or success feedback, and no matter what self-construal the participants
were primed to hold, participants in Study 3 had a general tendency to be less willing to
acknowledge the importance of ability and effort, rate the test negatively, and expressed less
interest in taking the test again in public than in private.
Self-construal type played an important role in moderating participants’ responses to
different types of feedback. Specifically, the independent participants were more likely to
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derogate the test when they failed than when they succeeded, and showed a stronger tendency to
self-serve in this manner than the interdependent participants. The IndeSC was associated with
being more derogating of the test when receiving failure feedback than success feedback than
was the InterSC. The IndeSC participants also expressed less interest in taking the test again after
receiving failure feedback than success feedback, whereas the InterSC participants expressed
more interest in retaking the test in response to failure feedback than success feedback.
Publicness had an impact on how participants primed with different self-construals
responded to different types of feedback. I predicted that the IndeSC group would become more
self-serving in public than in private. This prediction received support on only one response
measure: Recall. The IndeSC participants’ tendency to recall more positive self-relevant
descriptions than negative ones was found to be more prominent in public than in private. This
prediction, on the other hand, was contradicted by the findings on two other response measures:
effort attribution and retest intention. The tendency for the IndeSC participants to make lower
effort attribution sand show lower interest in taking the test again after receiving failure than
success feedback was found to be more pronounced in the private condition than the public
condition.
I also predicted that unlike the IndeSC group, the InterSC group not only would show
self-serving reactions to feedback in private, but also would inhibit self-serving tendencies in the
face of feedback in public. Findings for the success feedback condition supported this prediction.
Those primed with an InterSC showed lower interest in taking the test again and evaluated the
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test more negatively than those primed with an IndeSC did after receiving the SSGF feedback,
and they did so especially in public than in private. No such effects were found for the failure
feedback condition, though, or for any other dependent variables. This may be a sign that the
interdependent participants were concerned about caring for the graduate student’s welfare when
they were told that the graduat student had failed in the same test and that their responses would
be viewed by the graduate student.
To sum up, Study 3 found further support for the findings in Study 2 that suggested that the
self-construal prime manipulation was effective in triggering different responses to feedback.
Consistent with findings in Study 2, the IndeSC was associated with stronger self-serving
tendencies than the InterSC. The addition of the SSGF condition in Study 3 evoked inhibited
self-serving tendencies in the interdependent participants, which supported the notion that the
interdependent participants cared for the audience at the expense of their own self-esteem even in
the face of positive feedback. The manipulation of publicness of feedback responding situations
also had an impact on participants’ responses to feedback. The IndeSC participants’ self-serving
tendency was more in evident in public than in private (with an exception for the Effort
Attribution measure). However, the prediction that the interdependent participants would inhibit
their self-serving tendencies to a greater extent in public than in private did not receive much
support in Study 3.
General Discussion
The current research examined situations in which self-esteem concerns and interpersonal
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concerns dominate social encounters, respectively. Of major interest were people’s distinctive
behavior patterns in these situations. Three studies were conducted to illustrate that social
contexts put important constraints on one’s responses to negative feedback.
All three studies making up the current research involved false feedback which was provided
in the form of a bogus test score allegedly reflecting an important but conceptually vague ability
– “Integrative Ability”. In these studies, all the participants received the same test score, but were
provided with the opportunity to view various previous participants’ scores which were
fabricated and manipulated by the experimenter prior to taking the test. Thus, whether the test
score implied positive or negative performance depended on whether the participants were
shown low previous scores or high previous scores. Participants in Studies 1 and 3 received
either the high score version or the low score version for previous scores, whereas those in Study
2 all received the high score version.
Study 1 was conducted with complete confidentiality where participants were told to
respond to feedback in private. Studies 2 and 3 involved some kind of social situation
manipulation. Participants in Study 2 were told that their responses after receiving the feedback
would be viewed by another person of varied status who held a different standard for evaluating
their performance than their own. Study 3 involved the manipulation of the publicness of the
situation, while all the participants were told to respond to another person whose actual score
was either higher or lower than both their own and the “norm”. In Studies 2 and 3, participants
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were randomly assigned to receive either an IndeSC prime or an InterSC prime prior to
providing their responses to the feedback they had received.
The various social situation manipulations that unfolded in the three studies allowed the
self-serving tendencies participants exhibited to fluctuate with regard to self-construal, nature of
the feedback, the audience’s standard, the audience’s status, and the publicness of the responding
situation. While some results of Studies 2 & 3 did not conform closely to my hypotheses, there
were still significant effects that were consistent with some of the expected trends. In particular,
consistent results on the dependent measures Test Evaluation and Retest Intention emerged
across Studies 2 and 3, with the IndeSC being associated with stronger tendencies to self-serve
than the InterSC on these measures. Lack of consistent results was found on other dependent
measures between Study 2 and Study 3, including attributions made for the test outcome and
recall for the detailed feedback. The following is a discussion of the findings for each of the
critical factors involved in these three studies.
Feedback type
Based on findings from Studies 1 and 3, feedback type greatly impacted people’s responses.
In both studies, feedback type was manipulated in such a way that half of the participants found
that their test performance exceeded the “norm” the experimenter had pre-established in their
mind (i.e., failure feedback), whereas the other half received success feedback. Both studies
revealed a main effect for feedback type on a number of dependent measures. Participants who
received the failure feedback tended to be more self-serving, compared with those who received
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the success feedback in both studies, and this effect persisted regardless of self-construal,
publicness, audience’s status, or audience’s standard. These findings confirmed the notion that
failure feedback evoked more self-defensive responses than success feedback in general.
Self-construal
Self-construal was manipulated in Studies 2 and 3, where half of the participants were
primed to hold a temporary IndeSC, and the other half an InterSC. Priming was found to
influence how people react to feedback in both studies, which supported the prediction that the
self-serving tendency is more strongly associated with an IndeSC than an InterSC.
Study 2 demonstrated that the independent participants made more luck attributions when
they found that an audience held a stringent standard rather than a lenient standard, and they did
so to a greater degree than the interdependent participants. Study 3 found that the IndeSC
participants, but not the InterSC participants, recalled more positive feedback than negative
feedback (mainly in public). Both Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that the IndeSC participants who
received unfavorable evaluation rated the test more negatively and expressed less interest in
taking the test again than those who received favorable evaluation, and that they did so to a
greater degree than the InterSC participants. These results suggest that an IndeSC is associated
with greater reactiveness to feedback type than an InterSC. These findings confirmed my
hypotheses that people’s responses to various types of feedback are influenced by their
self-conceptions.
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These findings are in line with the distinction made between independent and interdependent
self-concepts as a generalization for the distinction between individualistic and collectivistic
cultures. Cross-cultural research that has examined the impact that cultural variations in the
self-concept have on self-serving tendencies has found that in general, people from collective
cultures are less self-serving in response to false feedback than those from individualistic
cultures (Heine & Hamamura, 2007; Heine, Kitayama, & Hamamura, 2007; Takata, 2003).
These cross-cultural differences can also be explained by self-construal differences. In other
words, those cross-cultural studies imply that members of individualistic cultures possessing an
independent form of self show greater self-serving biases than members of collectivistic cultures
who embrace an interdependent sense of self. While the current study did not directly compare
different culture groups, the notion that the IndeSC and the InterSC coexist within both
individualistic cultures and the collectivistic cultures has received wide recognition (see Cross et
al., 2011 for a review). The independent–interdependent self construal model is a more general
extension of the individualistic–collectivistic cultural distinction, from which it could be inferred
that people with an interdependent self construal are less likely to show self-serving tendencies
than those with an independent self construal, a generalization supported by the current study.
There has not been much research linking self-construal to self-serving responses to false
feedback (see Jacobson et al., 2012 for an exception). These findings are consistent with
previous research which suggested that type of self-construal significantly influences people’s
values and their perception of events (Gardner et al., 1999; Lalwani & Shavitt, 2009; Oishi,
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Wyer, & Colcombe, 2000). For instance, Lalwani and Shavitt (2009) used the same priming
procedure as the current research and found that participants with a salient IndeSC had a greater
tendency to engage in self-deceptive enhancement (as reflected on a scale) than did those in the
InterSC condition (Study 1). Oishi, Wyer, and Colcombe (2000) found that people who were
subliminally primed with independence-related concepts provided more internal attributions for
another person’s negative outcomes compared with those who were primed with
interdependence-related concepts (but see Krull et al., 1999). Jacobson et al. (2012) found that
when participants were primed with an InterSC (using the same priming procedure as in the
current study) they were equally accepting of positive and negative health related feedback.
These findings, along with findings in the current research, suggest that when an independent
sense of self-concept is aroused, a tendency toward self-centrism emerges.
The inhibited self-serving tendencies exhibited by the InterSC groups are in line with the
conceptualization of face which involves concerns about social and interpersonal harmony. Face
concerns are known to be more important to people who live in a collectivistic culture where an
InterSC is more prevalent and more culturally adaptive. Face concerns are less likely to lead to
self-serving behavior in general due to their relational nature. Therefore, face might have played
a role in moderating self-serving levels participants exhibited in the current studies, although
face was not formally operationalized or measured in the current studies. Furthermore, it is
reasonable to draw a connection between an InterSC and concerns about face because both
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constructs share the common emphasis on interpersonal dependence and other’s needs (Cross,
Bason, & Morris, 2000).
Audience’s standard
The current research also suggests that how people respond to failure feedback is influenced
by their representation of the audience’s standards. Study 2 manipulated audience standard in
such a way that half of the participants found that an audience held a high standard in evaluating
their test outcome, while the other half of the participants found that the audience held a low
standard. Recall that all the participants received negative feedback in Study 2 because they were
all shown a high-score version for “previous scores” prior to the task.
Confirming my hypotheses, Study 2 revealed that the IndeSC participants were more
concerned about being self-serving than the InterSC participants when they knew the audience
thought they did poorly than when they knew the audience thought they did well. Specifically,
the IndeSC participants, more than InterSC participants derogated the test, attributed the outcome
to more luck, and showed decreased interest in retaking the test after learning about the other
person’s high standard than after learning about the other person’s low standard. The InterSC
participants showed a stronger tendency to express interest in retaking the test and evaluate the
test positively (although this difference was not statistically significant) after receiving the other
person’s high standard than low standard, as opposed to the IndeSC participants. Overall, the
InterSC was found to be associated with lower levels of reactiveness toward the audience’s
different standards.
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The finding that the other’s standards have an effect on people’s reactions is consistent with
a number of traditional social psychology theories of the self. For instance, Cooley’s century old
theory of the “looking-glass self” (1902/1964) proposed that people understand their selves
through the eyes of others. Contemporary research on self-regulation (Moretti & Higgins, 1999 a,
b) has provided ample evidence in support of this view, suggesting that how people evaluate
themselves and perceive the difficulty of their goals is greatly influenced by the perceived
expectations of others.
There has been scant research that has examined people’s reactions to the other’s standards
as a function of self-construal (see White, Lehman, & Cohen, 2006 for a relevant study). The
current research filled the gap in the literature and suggested that the InterSC seems to be
associated with acceptance of the audience’s different standards. When the InterSC was primed,
people exhibited less self-enhancement after exposure to the audience’s low standard and fewer
self-defensive reactions after exposure to the audience’s high standard, compared to when the
IndeSC was primed. This finding is consistent with White, Lehman, and Cohen’s (2006) research,
which showed that people who were primed with an InterSC experience less positive affect after
exposure to a downward comparison target and also less negative affect after exposure to an
upward comparison target, a similar nondefensive reaction to different types of feedback
situations as was found in the current study.
The findings related to the interaction between self-construal and an audience’s standard
lend support to the role face plays. The benevolent reactions displayed by the participants primed
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with the InterSC can potentially be explained by face concerns. When a person is concerned
about face, he or she reacts in a way that maintains social harmony and avoids direct
confrontations. Defending against the other’s high standard in a public situation may undermine
the credibility of the other’s standard, hurt the other’s public image, and thus cause face loss for
the other. In a similar vein, savoring the other’s low standard in public may convey to the other
an impression of arrogance and narcissism, which may cause face loss for oneself. Alternatively,
reacting in compliance to the other’s standards sends a signal of respect, appropriateness and
caring for the other’s opinions, which saves face for both sides. Therefore, although the current
research did not directly operationalize and measure face concerns, these findings regarding
self-construal and audience’s standards are consistent with the face account.
Audience’s Status
The current research found some support for the role audience’s status plays in one’s
response to feedback. Audience’s status was manipulated in Study 2 in such a way that half of
the participants were made to believe that their responses to feedback would be viewed by a
senior graduate student (the high status audience condition), whereas the other half by a high
school student (the low status audience condition). Audience’s status was found to moderate the
self-serving reactions to feedback of participants who were primed with either an IndeSC or an
InterSC.
I expected to find that a high status audience would have a greater impact on both the
IndeSC group and the InterSC (in diverging directions) than a low status audience. To members
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of the IndeSC group who are concerned about self-esteem, evaluations from a high status
audience carries greater power than those from a low status audience. A person who emphasizes
self-esteem would feel more compelled to defend against a high status other’s criticism than a
low status other’s because impressing a high status audience is more important than impressing a
low status audience. Thus, it was predicted that the IndeSC would be associated with greater
reactiveness to the high status audience’s varied standards than the low status audience’s. To
people in the InterSC group who are concerned about the other’s welfare and interpersonal
harmony, upholding the high status audience’s opinions is more important than upholding the
low status audience’s. Therefore, it was predicted that the InterSC would be associated with
greater inhibited self-serving tendencies in responding to the high status audience’s varied
standards than to the low status audience’s.
For the InterSC group, there was some marginal evidence in support of the more pronounced
inhibited self-serving reaction prediction in the high-status audience condition than in the
low-status audience condition. The tendency for the InterSC group to evaluate the test less
negatively when the audience held a high standard and more positively when the audience held a
low standard compared to the IndeSC participants was more pronounced when the audience was
a high-status person than a low-status person. This finding is consistent with the concept of face,
as a major part of how much face a person possesses hinges on that person’s position in the
social hierarchy. A face-centered person who is focused on preserving social rank and harmony
is comfortable with not impressing a high status person because the high status person in any
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given interaction is supposed to have greater power to judge the other (most often negatively).
Receiving negative comments from a low status person, on the other hand, is a signal that
interaction rules have been disrupted because a low status person is not in a position to criticize
and thus embarrass the other. After all, the upholding of the higher-positioned person’s face is
always expected from face-centered people (Chang & Holt, 1994) in a given hierarchical
relationship.
Most results involving Other Status, however, did not support my hypotheses and suggested
that an audience of a low status rather than high status made a greater difference in affecting
participants’ reactions to feedback. For instance, the tendency for the IndeSC group to make
more luck attributions, evaluate the test more negatively, and express less interest in taking the
test again when the audience held a high standard rather than low standard was found to be more
pronounced when the audience was a low-status rather than a high-status person. In other words,
the self-serving reactions observed in the IndeSC participants were more pronounced in the
low-status audience condition than the high-status audience condition. Similarly, the inhibited
self-serving tendency found with the InterSC participants as manifested in being less likely to
make luck attributions and in expressing more interest in taking the test again in response to the
audience’s high versus low standard was more pronounced in the low-status audience condition
than in the high-status audience condition.
Despite enormous attention paid to false feedback and self-serving tendencies (see Hepper,
Gramzow, & Sedikides, 2010 for a review), researchers have surprisingly largely ignored
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whether the feedback giver’s status moderates people’s self-serving responses. Two relevant
studies were conducted in the area of social comparison in connection with self-evaluation, but
suggested inconsistent conclusions. Webster, Powell, Duvall, and Smith (2006) found that
college students who underperformed a lower-status other felt worse about themselves than
students who underperformed a higher-status other. This finding implied that the reason why the
IndeSC participants in the current research (Study 2) showed greater reactiveness to audience’s
varied standards in the low-status audience condition rather than the high-status audience
condition may be because they felt worse when a low-status person sent them the message that
they did poorly. However, Zell, Alicke, and Strickhouser (2015) found that college students who
outperformed a fictitious participant evaluated the participant more positively than those who
underperformed the participant, and this tendency was more pronounced when the other
participant was higher in status than when the other participant was equal or lower in status.
Considering these findings together with the current study, it is not clear how exactly status
influence people’s responses to evaluative feedback.
Publicness of feedback responding situation
Publicness seemed to have played a role in affecting how participants responded to feedback,
although findings from the current research did not confirm the hypotheses tested regarding to
the effect of publicness.
Publicness was manipulated in Study 3, where half of the participants responded to the
post-study questionnaire in a public situation, and the other half responded in a private situation.
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It was hypothesized that the differences in self-serving behavior between the independent
participants and interdependent ones would be magnified in public relative to in private. When
responding to feedback in a public situation, the independent self would prioritize his/her
self-esteem and focus on his/her own public image, whereas the interdependent self would
emphasize social harmony and making sure that no one gets humiliated in the ongoing social
interaction even if it means he or she needs to inhibit his or her own self-esteem and public
image promotion needs. The finding for the recall measure was consistent with this notion. That
finding revealed that when responding in public, participants in the IndeSC group recalled
significantly more positive self-relevant behavior than negative behavior. No such contrast was
found with the IndeSC participants in private, or with the InterSC participants either in public or
private.
However, other findings from Study 3 in the current research provided no positive evidence
to support the hypotheses tested related to publicness. Study 3 found that in general, participants
tended to externalize the feedback they received more when in public than when in private. They
were found to be less likely to make ability and effort attributions publicly than privately for the
feedback they received. Participants who responded in a public situation were also on average
more likely to derogate the test and expressed less interest in taking the test again than those in
the private condition. It is difficult to interpret these effects because these effects did not depend
on whether the participants received failure feedback or success feedback.
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Furthermore, the IndeSC participants who were told that they failed on the test on which a
high status person succeeded showed self-serving tendencies by expressing lower interest in
taking the test again than those who were told that they succeeded on the test on which a high
status person failed. This tendency was found to be more pronounced in the private condition
rather than the public condition, which contradicts my prediction. The IndeSC participants also
evaluated the test more negatively after receiving the Self-Fail Grad-Succeed feedback than
those who received the Self-Succeed Grad-Fail feedback, but this self-serving response was not
more pronounced in the public condition than in the private condition (despite a descriptive trend
in that direction).
The differentiation between private and public feedback has its precedents in the literature
mainly conducted with Western participants. Studies based on a self-presentational enhancement
account suggested that Western participants are more self-serving after public failures than
private ones arguably due to public image concerns (Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Frey, 1978;
Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985). An opposite pattern was obtained in other studies when
self-presentational enhancement was made undesirable because the participants were led to
believe that an audience was going to check the accuracy of information they provided (Smith &
Whitehead, 1993; Arkin et al., 1980; Brown & Gallagher, 1992; Greenberg et al., 1982; Ross,
Biebrauer, & Polly, 1974; Weary, 1980). Nevertheless, none of these previous studies considered
the role self-construal and interpersonal concerns play in affecting people’s responses to
feedback in public versus in private. Study 3 provided data to fill this gap, suggesting that the
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IndeSC participants were more self-serving when responding in private than when responding to
an audience when it came to effort attributions and retest intentions. However, they were less
self-serving in private than in public when asked to recall feedback descriptions. These
contradictory results may partly be due to the difference between self-report (of Effort
Attribution and Retest Intention) and recall (spontaneously) measures. Nevertheless, neither the
measure difference, nor the self-presentational enhancement account nor the information
accuracy account proposed in previous research could satisfactorily explain these results.
The publicness of the responding situations was not exactly a face-to-face interaction; rather,
participants were told that the audience was in a different room and would review their responses.
Despite minimum face-to-face interaction, the current research found effects for the audience’s
standards and status. This implies that if follow up research was to involve face-to-face
interaction between the participants and the audience, there might be even stronger effects
elicited by the audience.
Conclusions
The current series of studies to my knowledge is the first false feedback research which
systematically varied feedback source and interpersonal context to examine their impact on
people’s reactions to feedback.
These studies demonstrated that experimentally primed self-construal has an impact on
people’s responses to feedback. Across two studies, it was consistently found that temporarily
activated independent self-construal (IndeSC) was associated with self-serving responses to
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feedback, and interdependent self-construal (InterSC) was associated with inhibited self-serving
responses. Differential responses exhibited by the IndeSC individuals and the InterSC
individuals were found to be influenced by characteristics of feedback source and interpersonal
context including audience’s standard, audience’s status, and pubicness. These findings lend
support to the notion that people with different self-conceptions achieve well-being through
diverging routes, the InterSC individuals through caring for the other’s welfare (e.g., face) while
the IndeSC individuals through caring for self-esteem.
In conclusion, the current research examined the impact self-construal and interpersonal
contexts have on one’s reactions to negative self-relevant information using newly developed
perspectives provided by cross-cultural research (i.e., the concept of face). This research
addressed a gap in past false feedback research which largely ignored the role self-construal and
interpersonal context play in shaping people’s responses. This research provided evidence for the
argument that social contexts put important constraints on one’s self-serving responses to
negative feedback, and that people’s way of construing their selves has an impact on how they
interact with their immediate social situations regarding negative feedback.
The current research has benefited from existing cultural comparisons of individuals’
self-serving tendencies which have suggested universal patterns in some cases but cultural
differences in others. Findings in the current research helped to clarify the principles that not
only encompass past findings in false feedback research, but also accommodate the effects of
cultural variations. This research implied that the independent self-construal individuals and the

101

interdependent self-construal individuals likely achieve a sense of wellbeing through diverging
routes, namely, self-esteem enhancement versus interpersonal harmony management.
Limitations and future directions
This line of research adds to the false feedback literature by proposing that self-construal,
feedback source and interpersonal context influence individuals’ responses to self-relevant
feedback. Future research might continue to address unanswered questions in this research both
in methodology and in theoretical aspects.
First, I hypothesized that a high-status audience rather than a low-status audience would
have greater impact on both the IndeSC and the InterSC individuals’ reponses to feedback. The
results indicated the opposite pattern where both the self-serving tendencies exhibited by the
IndeSC individuals and the inhibited self-serving tendencies exhibited by the InterSC individuals
tended to be associated with low-status rather than high-status audience. These findings are
inconsistent with the notion that self-esteem is more severely threatened by a higher rather than
lower status other, nor are they in line with the concept of face which emphasizes protecting the
integrity of the higher status rather than lower status interactant. The current research did not
contain a manipulation check question to ask whether participants perceive the Graduate student
to be higher than them in status, and the high school student to be lower than them in status.
Therefore, it is unclear whether the status manipulation worked as intended. An alternative
explanation could be that the participants who were mostly freshmen and sophomores perceived
the high school students as peers and thus considered their standards to be more important than a

102

the standards of a graduate student, who seemed irrelevant to undergraduate students. Another
alternative account could be that as undergraduate students, the participants in the current
research may have been more concerned about impressing a high school student than a graduate
student because of a desire to be a “role model” and/or to maintain their superior status in front
of the high school student, but not in front of the graduate students. More research with an
improved manipulation of audience’s status and manipulation checks should be conducted to
explore these alternatives and clarify these findings.
Second, I hypothesized that responding to an audience rather than responding privately
would have a greater impact on both the IndeSC and the interSC individuals’ responses to
feedback. Despite the support for this hypothesis provided by the recall measure for the IndeSC
individuals, no such effect was found on the same measure for the InterSC individuals. Moreover,
opposite tendencies were revealed in the IndeSC individuals on other dependent measures such
as attribution and retest intention. No supportive evidence was found for the InterSC individuals
on these same or other dependent measures. One should acknowledge that there are underlying
differences in the nature of the recall measure and the other dependent variable measures, which
were self-report measures. Nevertheless, it is odd to find that the IndeSC individuals were less
self-serving in public than in private on self-report measures which by nature supposedly induce
more self-presentational enhancement in public than in private. As suggested by some previous
research (see Brown & Gallagher, 1992, and Smith & Whitehead, 1993, for examples), this
could be because participants feared that the information they provided would be subject to the
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audience’s scrutiny. This reasoning, however, is not robust because the two response measures
which produced significant differences, Effort Attribution and Retest Intention, were both highly
subjective measures and participants should have felt free to boast on these measures without
worrying about being scrutinized. Therefore, more research is needed to clarify the influence the
publicness of the situation has on people’s responses to feedback. Future research which
manipulates publicness should consider the role self-presentation concerns, information scrutiny
concerns, and the characteristics of the measures play in accounting for variations in individuals’
responses.
Last but not least, the discussion of audience’s status and publicness of situation is relevant
because these are important contextual factors derived from the concept of face. This research
benefited from the discussion of face in that it offered novel factors to explain variations in
people’s responses to false feedback. More importantly, results from this research offered
implications for developing a unifying account for various responses to feedback. This account,
as discussed elsewhere, would be based on the notion that different individuals (e.g., possessing
different self-construals) may achieve social well-being through two different routes, one
centered around self-esteem and the other centered around face(also see Figure 2). The current
research did not directly examine this account because face was not sufficiently operationalized,
manipulated or measured; neither was social well-being. Future research could carry on this
exploration, tapping into the different roles self-esteem concerns and face concerns play in
affecting the social wellbeing outcomes of different individuals.
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One who argues against studying face in the context of a Western culture may be concerned
about the fact that most Westerners are foreign to the concept of face, making it difficult for the
manipulation of face to elicit the desired variability among the Western participants. One
approach to this issue could be to examine face-related phenomena cross-culturally. Another,
more cost efficient approach is to conduct regional comparisons within the US society. The
culture of honor such as that dominates many states in the southern US shares similar
assumptions and cultural scripts with the culture of face (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Behaviors and
situations involved in defending for honor in many ways overlap with those involved in saving
face. Therefore, it may be feasible to compare how individuals react to feedback in the culture of
honor as opposed to in the culture of dignity in the northern US to shed light on the distinction
between saving face and maintaining self-esteem.
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Appendix A Tables and Figures
Table 1
Correlations between the test perception measures in Study 1

Test

Difficulty Fairness Validity

Clarity

Perception
Difficulty

1

Fairness

-.24*

1

Validity

.04

.51**

1

Clarity

-.14

.20

.18

Note. * p < .01; ** p < .001.

1

106

Table 2
Descriptives and effects of feedback type on response variables in Study 1

Positive feedback

Negative feedback

(n = 39)

(n = 56)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Ability attribution (1-5)

3.64 (0.87)

Effort attribution (1-5)

p-value

ηp 2

3.09 (0.90)

.004

.087

3.64 (0.67)

3.36 (0.90)

.10

.029

Luck attribution (1-5)

1.90 (0.88)

1.88 (0.81)

.90

.00

Difficulty perception (1-7)

5.13 (1.26)

4.93 (1.28)

.45

.01

Test evaluation (1-7)

5.70 (1.00)

4.87 (1.13)

.001

.13

Other prediction (1-7)

3.97 (1.16)

4.71 (1.19)

.003

.089

Other similarity (1-7)

3.90 (1.45)

4.38 (1.12)

.07

.034

Total

N = 95
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Table 3
Study 2 predictions

Graduate
Student

High Standard

IndeSC

InterSC

Self-serving++++:

Inhibited self-serving----:

Externalize failure, derogate

Externalize success, derogate

the test, avoid retaking

the test, avoid retaking

Self-serving++:
Low Standard

Internalize success, praise

Inhibited self-serving--

the test, interest to retake
High school

High Standard

Self-serving+++

Inhibited self-serving---

Student

Low Standard

Self-serving +

Inhibited self-serving-

Note. “+” and “-” signs are used to differentiate self-serving responses (+) from inhibited
self-serving (-) responses. Number of “+” or “-” represents the strength of the predicted effects in
such a way that the more signs indicate the stronger predicted tendencies. IndeSC = Independent
self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent self-construal.

108

Table 4
Effect of prime and audience’s standard on luck attribution in Study 2

IndeSC

InterSC

M (SD)

M (SD)

High standard

2.12 (1.04)

2.00 (0.95)

Low standard

1.72 (0.89)

2.09 (0.94)

Luck attribution*

Note. * p < .05. IndeSC = Independent self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent self-construal.
There was a significant Prime × Standard interaction for luck attribution, F(1, 244) = 3.95, p
= .048, ηp2 = .016.
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Table 5
Means of luck attribution for each condition in Study 2

IndeSC

InterSC

M (SD)

M (SD)

Luck attribution (ns)

High standard

2.07 (0.94)

2.00 (0.85)

Low standard

1.78 (0.85)

2.06 (0.86)

High standard

2.17 (1.12)

2.00 (1.01)

Low standard

1.67 (0.92)

2.12 (1.02)

Graduate

High school

Total

N = 252

Note. ns = non-significant. IndeSC = Independent self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent
self-construal. The Prime × Standard× Status three-way interaction was not significant despite a
significant simple comparison between the low standard and high standard cells in the IndeSC
high-school condition, F(1, 244) = 4.67, p = .032, ηp2 = .019, and a marginal simple comparison
between the IndeSC and InterSC cells in the high-school low standard condition, F(1, 244) =
3.41, p = .056, ηp2 = .015.
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Table 6
Correlations between the test perception measures in Study 2
Test
Difficulty Fairness Validity

Clarity

perceptions
Difficulty

1

Fairness

-.15*

1

Validity

.02

.49**

1

Clarity

.05

.23**

.31**

Note. * p < .01; ** p < .001.

1
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Table 7
Effect (non-significant) of prime and audience’s standard on test evaluation in Study 2
IndeSC

InterSC

M (SD)

M (SD)

High standard

4.66 (1.04)

4.97 (0.95)

Low standard

5.14 (0.89)

5.34 (0.94)

Test evaluation (ns)

Note. ns = non-significant. IndeSC = Independent self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent
self-construal. Prime had a marginal effect on test evaluation, F(1, 244) = 3.44, p = .065, ηp2
= .014. The Prime × Standard interaction for test evaluation was not significant, p = .70.
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Table 8
Means of Test Evaluation for each condition in Study 2

IndeSC

InterSC

M (SD)

M (SD)

High standard

4.68 (1.17)

5.03 (1.10)

Low standard

5.06 (1.12)

5.30 (0.80)

High

High standard

4.65 (1.12)

4.93 (1.20)

school

Low standard

5.20 (1.22)

5.37 (1.01)

Total

N = 252

Test evaluation (ns)

Graduate

Note. ns = non-significant. IndeSC = Independent self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent
self-construal. The Prime × Other Standard × Other Status interaction was not significant for test
evaluation, p = .91. There was a significant simple comparison between the low standard and
high standard cells in the IndeSC high-school condition, F(1, 244) = 4.30, p = .039, ηp2 = .017.
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Table 9
Effects of prime and audience’s standard on retest intention in Study 2

IndeSC

InterSC

M (SD)

M (SD)

High standard

3.14 (0.93)

3.52(0.96)

Low standard

3.50 (1.03)

3.36 (0.99)

Retest intention*

Note. * p =.05. IndeSC = Independent self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent self-construal.
There was a significant Prime × Standard interaction for retest intention, F(1, 244) = 3.84, p
= .05, ηp2 = .015.
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Table 10
Means of retest intention for each condition in Study 2

IndeSC

InterSC

M (SD)

M (SD)

High standard

3.33 (.84)

3.43 (1.04)

Low standard

3.48 (1.01)

3.45 (0.79)

High standard

2.97 (0.99)

3.58 (0.92)

Low standard

3.52 (1.06)

3.27 (1.15)

Retest intention (ns)

Graduate

High school

Total

N = 251

Note. ns = non-significant. IndeSC = Independent self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent
self-construal. The Prime × Other Standard × Other Status interaction was not significant for
retest intention. There was a significant simple comparison between the low standard and high
standard cells in the IndeSC high-school condition, F(1, 244) = 5.02, p = .023, ηp2 = .021. There
was also a significant simple comparison between the IndeSC and InterSC cells in the
high-school high standard condition, F(1, 244) = 7.00, p = .009, ηp2 = .028.

.
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Table 11
Study 3 predictions
Self-Fail Grad-Succeed
Self-serving+++:
Externalize failure
IndeSC
Private

Public

derogate the test, avoid
retaking

Self-Succeed Grad-Fail
Self-serving+：
Internalize success, praise
the test, interest to retake

InterSC

Self-serving+

Self-serving

IndeSC

Self-serving++++

Self-serving++

InterSC

Inhibited self-serving----

Inhibited self-serving--

Note. “+” and “-” signs are used to differentiate self-serving responses (+) from inhibited
self-serving (-) responses. Number of “+” or “-” represents the strength of the predicted effects in
such a way that the more signs indicate the stronger tendencies. IndeSC = Independent
self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent self-construal.
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Table 12
Correlations between the test perception measures in Study 3
Test

Difficulty Fairness Validity Clarity

perceptions
Difficulty

1

Fairness

.13*

1

Validity

.18*

.51**

1

Clarity

.07

.24**

.18**

Note. * p < .01; ** p < .001.

1
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Table 13
Means for ability attribution in each of the conditions in Study 3
Self-Fail

Self-Succeed

Grad-Succeed

Grad-Fail

M (SD)

M (SD)

IndeSC

3.22 (1.19)

3.54 (1.05)

InterSC

3.33 (1.06)

3.54 (0.95)

IndeSC

3.09 (1.19)

3.33 (0.66)

InterSC

2.97 (0.88)

3.30 (0.95)

Ability attribution (ns)

Private

Public

Total

N = 303

Note. ns = non-significant. IndeSC = Independent self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent
self-construal. Feedback Type had a significant effect on ability attribution, F(1, 295) = 6.28, p
= .013, ηp2 = .021. Publicness also had a significant effect on it, F(1, 295) = 4.03, p = .046, ηp2
= .013. There was not a significant main effect for Prime. The Prime × Publicness × Feedback
Type interaction was not significant for ability attribution, p = .73. Results did not differ between
the lab sample and the MTurk sample.
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Table 14
Means for effort attribution in each of the conditions in Study 3
Self-Fail

Self-Succeed

Grad-Succeed

Grad-Fail

M (SD)

M (SD)

IndeSC

3.28 (1.13)

3.88 (0.82)

InterSC

3.30 (0.81)

3.54 (0.70)

IndeSC

3.15 (1.08)

3.13 (1.01)

InterSC

3.00 (1.01)

3.30 (0.95)

Effort attribution†

Private

Public

Total

N = 303

Note. † Small p value. IndeSC = Independent self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent
self-construal. Feedback type had a significant effect on effort attribution, F(1, 295) = 6.94, p
= .01. Publicness also had a significant effect on it, F(1, 295) = 10.69, p = .001. The Prime ×
Publicness × Feedback Type interaction was marginal, F(1, 295) =2.44, p = .12. There was a
significant simple comparison between the Self-Fail Grad-Succeed and Self-Succeed Grad-Fail
cells in the IndeSC condition, F(1, 295) = 9.18, p = .003, ηp2 = .030. There was also a significant
simple comparison between the private and public cells in the IndeSC Self-Succeed Grad-Fail
condition, F(1, 295) = 11.87, p = .001, ηp2 = .039. Patterns did not differ between the lab sample
and the MTurk sample.
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Table 15
Effects of prime and feedback type on test evaluation in Study 3
IndeSC

InterSC

M (SD)

M (SD)

Self-Fail Grad-Succeed

4.59 (1.13)

4.79 (1.07)

Self-Succeed Grad-Fail

5.43 (0.90)

5.01 (1.19)

Test evaluation*

Note. * p < .05. IndeSC = Independent self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent self-construal.
Feedback type had a significant effect on test evaluation, F(1, 295) =18.7, p < .001, ηp2 = .059.
There was a significant Prime × Feedback Type interaction, F(1, 295) = 5.54, p = .019, ηp2
= .018. Results did not differ between the lab sample and the MTurk sample.
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Table 16
Means for test evaluation in each of the conditions in Study 3
Test evaluation (ns)

Self-Fail

Self-Succeed

Grad-Succeed

Grad-Fail

M (SD)

M (SD)

IndeSC

4.79 (1.16)

5.52 (0.88)

InterSC

4.97 (1.11)

5.10 (1.11)

IndeSC

4.36 (1.58)

5.29 (0.93)

InterSC

4.56 (1.40)

4.92 (1.28)

Private

Public

Total

N = 303

Note. ns = non-significant. IndeSC = Independent self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent
self-construal. The Prime × Feedback type × Publicness interaction was not significant (p = .93).
The was a significant simple comparison between the Self-Fail Grad-Succeed and Self-Succeed
Grad-Fail cells in both the private IndeSC condition (F(1, 295) = 10.20, p = .002, ηp2 = .033),
and the public IndeSC condition (F(1, 295) = 12.03, p = .001, ηp2 = .039). Patterns did not differ
between the lab sample and the MTurk sample.
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Table 17
Effects of prime and feedback type on retest intention in Study 3
Retest Intention**

IndeSC

InterSC

M (SD)

M (SD)

Self-Fail Grad-Succeed

3.24 (1.06)

3.46 (1.12)

Self-Succeed Grad-Fail

3.83 (0.96)

3.26 (1.21)

Note. ** p < .01. IndeSC = Independent self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent self-construal.
There was a significant Prime × Feedback Type interaction, F(1, 295) = 8.26, p = .004, ηp2
= .027. Results did not differ between the lab sample and the MTurk sample.

122

Table 18
Means for retest intention in each of the conditions in Study 3

Self-Fail

Self-Succeed

Grad-Succeed

Grad-Fail

M (SD)

M (SD)

IndeSC

3.17 (1.13)

3.94 (0.93)

InterSC

3.64 (0.97)

3.43 (1.15)

IndeSC

3.32 (0.98)

3.67 (0.99)

InterSC

3.22 (1.27)

3.09 (1.26)

Retest Intention (ns)

Private

Public

Total

N = 303

Note. IndeSC = Independent self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent self-construal. The Prime ×
Feedback type × Publicness interaction was not significant (p = .32). The was a significant
simple comparison between the Self-Fail Grad-Succeed and Self-Succeed Grad-Fail cells in the
private IndeSC condition, F(1, 295) =10.85, p = .001, ηp2 = .035. Patterns did not differ between
the lab sample and the MTurk sample.
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Table 19
Effects of prime and valence of behavior descriptions on recall of behaviors in Study 3
Positive behavior

Negative behavior

M (SD)

M (SD)

IndeSC

2.32 (1.49)

2.27 (1.27)

InterSC

2.33 (1.06)

2.07 (1.35)

IndeSC

2.61 (1.34)

2.17 (1.01)

InterSC

2.27 (1.31)

2.36 (1.38)

Recall*

Private

Public

Total

N = 292

Note. * p = .05. IndeSC = Independent self-contrual; InterSC = Interdependent self-construal.
There was a significant Positivity × Prime × Publicness interaction, F(1, 284) = 3.88, p = .050,
ηp2 = .013. This significance was mainly driven by the simple comparison between the Positive
behavior and Negative behavior cells in the public IndeSC condition, F(1, 284) = 4.87, p = .028,
ηp2 = .017. Results did not differ between the lab sample and the MTurk sample.
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Figure 1. An example item (3 × 3 matrix) of the 36-item “Integrative Ability” test in the current
research. These items are part of the intelligence test Raven's Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court
& Raven, 1988). Each question contains a 6 × 6, 4 × 4, or 3 × 3 matrix of figures that follow a
certain pattern such as the above. For each question, the participant is asked to identify the
missing element that completes the pattern depicted by the matrix. The answer for this example
is Choice 5.

125

Figure 2. Theoretical framework for the current research. Hypotheses for Studies 2 and 3 were
derived based on this framework.
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Figure 3. Study 1 experiment design and procedure. Study 1 followed a one-factor (Internal
feedback: positive vs. negative) between-subject design.
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Figure 4. Study 2 experiment design and procedure. Study 2 followed a 2 (Prime: independent
self-construal vs. interdependent self-construal)× 2 (Other Status: high school student vs. senior
graduate student) ×2 (Other standard: high vs. low) between-subject factorial design.
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Figure 5. Study 3 experiment design and procedure. Study 3 followed a 2 (Feedback type:
Self-Succeed Grad-Fail vs. Self-Fail Grad-Succeed) × 2 (Prime: independent self-construal vs.
interdependent self-construal) × 2 (Publicness: public vs. private) between-subject factorial
design.
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Was luck a factor (1-5)?
3
2.5
2
Independent Self

1.5

Interdependent Self

1
0.5
0
HighStandard

LowStandard

Figure 6. The effects of self-construal and audience’s standard on luck attribution in Study 2.
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Would you take the test again (1-5)?
5

4
Independent Self
Interdependent Self

3

2
HighStandard

LowStandard

Figure 7. The effects of self-construal and audience’s standard on retest intention in Study 2.
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Test Evaluation(1-7)
6
5
Independent Self
4

Interdependent Self

3
Self-Fail GradSucceed

Self-Succeed GradFail

Figure 8. The effects of self-construal and performance comparison on test evaluation in Study 3.
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Would you take the test again(1-5)?
5

4
Independent Self
Interdependent Self

3

2
Self-Fail GradSucceed

Self-Succeed GradFail

Figure 9. The effects of self-construal and performance comparison on retest intention in Study
3.
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Recall of interpretation
3

2

Independent Self
Interdependent Self

1
Positive Public

Positive Private

Negative Public

Negative Private

Figure 10. The effects of self-construal, publicness, and valence of behavioral interpretation on
recall of interpretation in Study 3.
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Appendix B

Materials for constructing detailed feedback

Social
•

You would be promoted to the leader's position in a job because you are the person that
everyone seemed to listen to and respond to.

•

You would laugh along with everyone else at the embarrassing stories from when you
were young that your dad was telling about you.

NonSocial
•

You would fidget in the library whenever a new person walked by.

•

You would be mentally exhausted after even the briefest conversation with others.

Trustworthy
•

You would follow through on a promise made to friends.

•

A teacher would leave you alone in a room while taking a test and not be afraid that you
would cheat.

Untrustworthy
•

An employer would not rely on you to have an important project completed by the
deadline.

•

You would gossip about a good friend to other people.

Kind
•

You would help your friend study for a difficult exam even though you had a great deal
of work to do.

135

•

You would help people by opening a door if their hands were full.

Unkind
•

You would ignore someone at a party that you did not know very well.

•

You would get in a heated argument with someone over a minor issue.
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Appendix C

Supplementary analyses

Study 2
Analyses. Nine dependent measures, including Ability Attribution, Effort Attribution, Luck
Attribution, Difficulty Perception, Fairness Perception, Validity Perception, Clarity Perception, Other
Similarity, and Retest Intention were entered into separate Univariate ANOVA analyses to examine the
effect of Prime, Other Standard, and Other Status on these individual measures. An alpha level of .05 was
used for all the significance tests. Bonferroni correction was applied to multiple comparisons where
necessary. A total of 250 participants’ data were included because the SPSS GLM procedure utilized the
listwise deletion method.
Results. In general, the results for this set of analyses are consistent with those reported in Study 2
results section.
Attributions. None of the main effects were significant for any of the attribution measures.
There was a Prime × Standard interaction for luck attribution, F(1, 243) =4.24, p = .04. No such
interactions were found for the other three attributions. Multiple comparisons showed that participants
primed with the IndeSC made significantly more luck attributions when responding to the other’s high
standard (M = 2.14 SD = 1.04) than the other’s low standard (M = 1.89, SD = 0.89), F(1, 243) = 5.71, p
= .02. No such significant differences were found for the InterSC participants. When the audience was
perceived to hold a low standard (indicating a positive outcome), the IndeSC group were significantly less
likely to believe it was due to luck (M = 1.72, SD = 0.89), compared with the InterSC group(M = 2.09, SD
= 0.94, F(1, 243) = 4.59, p = .03. No such significant difference was found when the audience held a high
standard.
This two-way interaction was not qualified by a Prime × Standard× Status three-way interaction for
Luck Attribution, despite a significant simple comparison between the high-school high standard (M =
2.17, SD =1.12) and high-school low standard conditions (M = 1.67, SD = 0.92) for the IndeSC group,
F(1, 243) = 4.67, p = .032. There was also a marginal trend such that when the high school student, but
not the graduate student, held a low standard, the InterSC group were more likely to attribute the result to
luck (M = 2.12, SD = 1.02) than participants in the IndeSC group (M = 1.67, SD = 0.92), F(1, 243) = 3.68,
p = .056. Other comparisons were not significant.
Test Perceptions.
Difficulty Perception. Similar to Study 1’s finding for Difficulty Perception, neither the
independent variables nor their interactions had a significant effect on the difficulty measure, p > .05.
Fairness Perception. Neither Prime nor Audience’s Status had a significant main effect on
Fairness Perception, although Audience’s Standard did (F(1, 243) = 3.79, p = .05).

Participants who

perceived that the audience held a high standard (M = 4.42, SD = 1.52) considered the test to be less fair
than those who perceived a low standard (M = 4.82, SD = 1.41). No significant two-way or three-way
interactions were found for Fairness Perception. A significant simple comparison showed that the IndeSC
participants, in particular, considered the test to be less fair in response to the high school student’s high
standard(M = 4.79, SD = 1.54)

than to low standard (M = 4.09, SD = 1.48), F(1, 243) = 3.88, p = .05.
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Validity Perception. Prime had a significant effect on Validity Perception, F(1, 243) = 5.56, p
= .02. Participants considered the test to be less valid when primed with an IndeSC (M = 4.27, SD = 1.56)
than when primed with an InterSC (M = 4.72, SD = 1.51). Other Standard had a main effect on Validity
Perception, F(1, 243) = 7.36, p = .007. When the other held a high standard, participants considered to the
test to be less valid (M = 4.21, SD = 1.61) than when the other held a low standard (M = 4.79, SD = 1.43).
No significant two-way or three-way interactions were found for Validity Perception. A significant simple
comparison showed that the IndeSC participants, in particular, considered the test to be less valid in
response to the high school student’s high standard(M = 3.89, SD = 1.69) than to low standard (M = 4.70,
SD = 1.53), F(1, 243) = 4.87, p = .03. When the graduate student held a high standard, the IndeSC
participants (M = 4.00, SD = 1.39) considered the test to be less valid than the InterSC participants (M =
4.83, SD = 1.11) did, F(1, 243) = 3.81, p = .05.
Clarity Perception. Audience’s Status had a significant main effect on Clarity Perception, F(1,
243) = 5.40, p = .02. Audience’s Standard had a marginal main effect on Clarity Perception, F(1, 243) =
3.06, p = .08. Participants considered the test instructions to be less clear when the audience was a high
status person (M = 5.77, SD = 1.52) rather than a low status person (M = 6.16, SD = 1.52), and when the
audience held a high standard (M = 5.84, SD = 1.51) rather than a low standard (M = 6.13, SD = 1.34). No
significant two-way or three-way interactions were found for Clarity Perception, neither were any
significant simple comparisons.
Other Similarity. The independent variables in the current study had no significant impact on
this particular dependent variable.
Retest Intention. None of the main effects were significant for Retest Intention. Prime and
Standard interacted to influence Retest Intention, F(1, 243) = 4.00, p = .047. Participants primed with the
independent self were less willing to take the test again when responding to the other’s high standard (M
= 3.13, SD = 0.93) than the other’s low standard (M = 3.50, SD = 1.03), F(1, 243) = 4.07, p = .045. When
the audience was perceived to hold a high standard, the independent self was significantly less willing to
take the test again (M = 3.13, SD = 0.93), compared with the interdependent self (M = 3.52, SD = 0.96),
F(1, 243) = 4.19, p = .042.
The two-way interaction revealed above was not qualified by a Prime × Standard× Status three-way
interaction (p = .16). However, There was a significant pairwise comparison between the IndeSC (M =
2.97, SD = 0.99) and InterSC (M = 3.58, SD = 0.92) participants in the high school high standard
conditions, F(1, 243) = 7.00, p = .009. There was also a significant pairwise comparison between the high
standard (M = 2.97, SD = 0.99) and low standard (M = 3.52, SD =1.06) cells in the IndeSC high school
student condition, F(1, 243) = 5.22, p = .023.
Recall. Results for recall remained the same as those reported in Study 2 results section.
Study 3
Analyses. Nine dependent measures, including Ability Attribution, Effort Attribution, Luck
Attribution, Difficulty Perception, Fairness Perception, Validity Perception, Clarity Perception, Other
Similarity, and Retest Intention were entered into separate Univariate ANOVA analyses to examine the
effect of Prime, Other Standard, and Other Status on these individual measures. An alpha level of .05 was
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used for all the significance tests. Because SPSS deleted missing data listwise when applying ANOVAs,
this set of analyses were based on 300 participants’ data rather than 303 participants as in the Study 3
results section.
Results. In general, the results for this set of analyses are consistent with those reported in Study 3
results section.
Attributions. Ability Attribution was significantly influenced by Feedback Type, F(1, 292) =
6.57, p = .011, as well as by Publicness, F(1, 292) =3.68, p = .056. Likewise, Effort Attribution was
significantly influenced by Feedback Type, F(1, 292) = 7.16, p = .008, as well as by Publicness, F(1, 292)
= 10.16, p = .002. Participants who received the SFGS feedback were less likely to attribute their results
to ability (M = 3.16, SD = 1.09, vs. the SSGF feedback condition, M = 3.46, SD = 0.83) or effort (M =
3.19, SD = 1.00, vs. the SSGF feedback condition, M = 3.52, SD = 0.87). Those who answered dependent
measure questions in a public situation make less ability attributions (M = 3.17, SD = 0.95, vs. private
condition, M = 3.40, SD = 1.00) or effort attributions (M = 3.15, SD = 0.98, vs. M = 3.51, SD = 0.91 in the
private condition). Prime did not have a significant main effect on any of the attribution measures. Luck
attribution, in particular, was not influenced by any of the conditions.
The Prime × Publicness × Feedback Type interaction was not significant for Ability Attribution (p
= .81), neither was it significant for Effort Attribution (p = .15). No significant simple comparisons were
found for Ability Attribution. For Effort Attribution, pairwise comparisons suggested that the IndeSC
participants made significantly more effort attribution for SSGF feedback (M = 3.88, SD = 0.82) than for
SFGS feedback (M= 3.28, SD = 1.15) in the private situation, F(1, 292) = 8.80, p = .003. No such
significance was found for the InterSC participants. The IndeSCs participants also made significantly
more effort attribution for the SSGF feedback in the private(M = 3.88, SD= 0.82) than the public
condition (M = 3.17, SD = 1.00), F(1, 292) = 10.38, p = .001. No other pairwise comparisons were found
significant.
Test Perceptions.
Difficulty Perception. Neither the independent variables nor their interactions had a significant
effect on the Difficulty Perception measure.
Validity Perception. Validity Perception was significantly affected by Feedback Type, F(1, 292)
=16.68, p < .001. Participants who received the SFGS feedback were less likely to consider the test to be
valid (M = 3.94, SD = 1.60) than those received the SSGF feedback(M = 4.72, SD = 1.53). Validity
Perception was also significantly affected by Publicness of the situation, F(1, 292) = 4.21, p = .041.
Participants who answered dependent measure questions in a public situation reported the test to be less
valid (M = 4.08, SD = 1.56) than those in the private condition(M = 4.50, SD = 1.64).
There was a Prime and Feedback type interaction on Validity Perception, F(1, 292) = 8.23, p = .004.
Multiple comparisons suggested that people primed with an IndeSC considered the test to be significantly
less valid when receiving SFGS feedback (M = 3.75, SD = 1.67) than when receiving SSGF feedback (M
= 5.05, SD = 1.33), F(1, 292) = 23.96, p < .001, a pattern not observed in those primed with an InterSC.
In addition, the IndeSC participants (M = 5.05, SD = 1.33) rated the test to be more valid than the InterSC
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participants did (M = 4.34, SD = 1.66) after receiving the SSGF feedback, F(1, 292) = 6.32, p = .012.
Other multiple comparisons were not significant.
The overall three-way interaction was not significant for Validity Perception (p = .46). Multiple
comparisons suggested that the IndeSC participants considered the test to be more valid after receiving
the SSGF feedback than after receiving the SFGS feedback, both in private (F(1, 292) = 13.56, p < .001)
and in public (F(1, 292) = 10.83, p = .001. No such distinctions were found for InterSC participants
whether responding in private or in public. When responding to the SSGF feedback in a private situation,
those primed with an IndeSC had a greater tendency to perceive the test to be valid (M = 5.25, SD = 1.30)
than those primed with an InterSC did (M = 4.54, SD = 1.67), F(1, 292) = 4.26, p = .04. When responding
to the SFGS feedback in a public situation, the IndeSC participants rated the test to be less valid (M =
3.44, SD = 1.30) than the InterSC participants did (M = 4.14, SD = 1.64), F(1, 292) = 3.58, p = .06.
Fairness Perception. Fairness Perception was significantly affected by Feedback Type, F(1,
292) = 14.22, p < .001. Participants who received the SFGS feedback were less likely to consider the test
to be fair (M = 4.37, SD = 1.54) than those who received the SSGF feedback(M = 4.99, SD = 1.39).
A marginal Publicness × Feedback Type interaction was found for Fairness Perception, F(1, 292) =
3.26, p = .07. Participants rated the test to be less fair in public after receiving the SGFS (M = 4.14, SD =
1.52) rather than the SSGF feedback(M = 5.10, SD = 1.41), F(1, 292) = 13.95, p < .001. Other simple
comparisons were not significant for this two-way interaction.
The Prime × Publicness × Feedback Type interaction for Fairness Perception was not significant (p
= .19). The IndeSC participants considered the test to be more fair after receiving the SSGF feedback than
after receiving the SFGS feedback, both in private (F(1, 292) = 5.10, p = .025) and in public (F(1, 292) =
10.83, p = .018. The InterSC participants did not respond differently to the different types of feedback in
private, but considered the test to be more fair after receiving the SSGF feedback (M = 3.97, SD = 1.38)
than after receiving the SFGS feedback (M = 5.00, SD = 1.48) in public (F(1, 292) = 8.47, p = .004).
Unexpectedly, when receiving the SFGS feedback, the InterSC participants perceived the test to be more
fair in private (M = 4.78, SD = 1.47) rather than in public (M = 3.97, SD = 1.38), F(1, 292) = 6.17, p
= .014.
No other effects were found for Fairness Perception.
Clarity Perception. Clarity Perception was significantly affected by Publicness, F(1, 292) =
8.17, p = .005. Participants who answered dependent measures in public reported the test instructions to
be less clearer (M = 5.63, SD = 1.57) than those in the private condition(M = 6.12, SD = 1.22).
The Prime × Publicness × Feedback Type interaction for Clarity Perception was not significant (p = .51).
Simple comparisons showed that the IndeSC participants considered the test to be more clear after
receiving the SSGF feedback (M = 6.07, SD = 1.16) than after receiving the SFGS (M = 5.32, SD = 1.67)
feedback in public, F(1, 292) = 4.53, p = .034. The IndeSC participants rated the test instructions be to
less clear after receiving the SFGS feedback in public (M = 5.32, SD = 1.67) rather than in private (M =
6.10, SD = 1.12), F(1, 292) = 5.74, p = .017. No other effects were found for Clarity Perception.
Other Similarity. Neither the independent variables nor their interactions had a significant
effect on the Other Similarity measure.
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Retest Intention. No main effects of the independent variables were found for Retest
Intention. Prime and Feedback type interacted to affect participants’ intention to take the same test again,
F(1, 292) = 8.54, p = .004. Multiple comparisons suggested that the IndeSC participants were
significantly less willing to take the test again after receiving the SFGS (M = 3.23, SD = 1.06) rather than
the SSGF feedback (M = 3.84, SD = 0.96), F(1, 292) = 10.17, p = .002, a pattern not observed in those
primed with an InterSC. In addition, the IndeSC participants (M = 3.84, SD = .96) were more willing to
take the test again than the InterSC participants(M = 3.26, SD = 1.21) after receiving the SSGF feedback,
F(1, 292) = 9.13, p = .003. Other multiple comparisons were not significant. Other two-way interactions
were not significant.
This two-way interaction was not qualified by a significant three-way interaction (p = .34), although
multiple comparisons suggested that when responding to the SSGF feedback in a private situation, the
IndeSC participants were more willing to take the test again (M = 3.94, SD = 0.93) than those primed
with an InterSC were (M = 3.43, SD = 1.15), F(1, 292) = 4.45, p = .036. This pattern was reversed in the
SFGS feedback condition, where they were less willing to take the test again (M = 3.15, SD = 1.14) than
those primed with an InterSC were (M = 3.63, SD = 0.97) in a private situation, F(1, 292) = 4.07, p = .045.
In line with these results, when responding to the SSGF feedback in a public situation, the IndeSC
participants expressed more willingness to take the test again (M = 3.69, SD =1.00) than the InterSC
participants did (M = 3.09, SD = 1.26), F(1, 292) = 4.70, p = .031. Not surprisingly, the IndeSC
participants were more willing to take the test again after receiving the SSGF feedback (M = 3.94, SD =
0.93) than after receiving the SFGS feedback (M = 3.15, SD = 1.14) when responding in private, F(1, 292)
= 11.22, p = .001, a pattern not found in public, or in the InterSC participants either in private or in public.
Recall. Results for recall data remain the same as those reported in Study 3 results section since it
was an analysis independent from the above analyses.
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